Information processing and jury decisionmaking

Klevorick, Alvin K.; Rothschild, Michael; Winship, Christopher

doi:10.1016/0047-2727(84)90031-8

Cited by 51 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 8 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…experts) who give individual recommendations (or votes). Klevorick, Rothschild and Winship (1984) characterize the maximum improvement that can be achieved by collecting all information compared to majority voting in the absence of incentive problems. When instead individual incentives are taken into account, the aggregation of information depends on how the objective functions of the experts depend on the final decision made, the state of the world and the recommendations given (or messages sent).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?

Ottaviani

Sørensen

2001

Journal of Public Economics

184

143

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Privately informed individuals speak openly in front of other members of a committee about the desirability of a public decision. Each individual wishes to appear well informed. For any given order of speech, committee members may herd by suppressing their true information. With individuals of heterogeneous expertise, optimizing over the order of speech can improve the extraction of information, but not perfectly so. It is not always optimal to use the common anti-seniority rule whereby experts speak in order of increasing expertise. A committee with more able experts may be afflicted by greater herding problems, yielding a worse outcome. One Englishman is an island. Two Englishmen are a queue. Three Englishmen are a committee.

show abstract

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?

Ottaviani

Sørensen

2001

Journal of Public Economics

184

143

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…12 One shortcoming of these papers is that they implicitly assume that each voter behaves sincerely, conditioning her vote only on her own information.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution

Maug

Yılmaz

2002

American Economic Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Earlier studies of two-alternative models include [19], [27], [28] and [34]. Other related papers include [6], [7], [9], [20], [21], [31], [32] and [33]. Extensions of the two-alternative model have been suggested in [4], [5] and [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

First and Second Best Voting Rules in Committees

Ben-Yashar

Milchtaich

2005

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract.A committee of people with common preferences but different abilities in identifying the best alternative (e.g., a jury) votes in order to decide between two alternatives. The first best voting rule is a weighted voting rule that takes the different individual competences into account, and is therefore not anonymous, i.e., the voters' identities matter. Under this rule, it is rational for the committee members to vote according to their true opinions, or informatively. This is not necessarily true for an anonymous voting rule, under which members may have an incentive to vote noninformatively. Thus, strategic, sophisticated voters may vary their voting strategies according to the voting rule rather than naively voting informatively. This paper shows that the identity of the best anonymous and monotone (i.e., quota) voting rule does not depend on whether the committee members are strategic or naive or whether some are strategic and some are naive. One such rule, called the second best rule, affords the highest expected utility in all cases.* We are grateful to Jacob Paroush, Shmuel Nitzan, Steven Brams, Michele Piccione and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussions.

show abstract

Information processing and jury decisionmaking

Cited by 51 publications

References 8 publications

Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?

Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?

Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution

First and Second Best Voting Rules in Committees

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About