Information Privacy Protection Based on Verifiable (t, n)-Threshold Multi-Secret Sharing Scheme

Abstract

General secret sharing schemes comprise a secret dealer and a number of participants. The dealer can randomly generate a secret and then distribute shares of the secret to the participants. Verifiable multi-secret sharing enables a dealer to share multiple secrets among a group of participants such that the deceptive behaviors of the dealer and the participants can be detected. However, in the absence of secure channels, few verifiable secret sharing schemes can simultaneously share multiple secrets at one time. In this paper, we present an information privacy protection and verifiable multi-secret sharing scheme with a simple structure and high security. Each participant can verify correctness of the share distribution process based on public information published by the dealer and guarantee validity of the received share to avoid offering fake information in the process of restoring the original secret. Our performance and security analysis indicate that the newly proposed scheme is more efficient and practical while maintaining the same level of security compared with similar protocols available.

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“…It needs t 2 elliptic curve scalar multiplication operations to verify its correctness and other secret shadows. In the secret reconstruction stage, the PVS-MSS scheme shares the secret on the coefficient of f (x, 0), so the calculation cost in the secret reconstruction stage is the same as that in the scheme [23,28,30,31,33,36], both of which are Lagrange interpolation calculations, and the worst is Lagrange interpolation of k points. Suppose T M is the operation time of elliptic curve scalar multiplication.…”

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