Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers

Colucci, Domenico; Doni, Nicola; Valori, Vincenzo

doi:10.1007/s00712-014-0405-5

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…sealed-bid buyer-determined auctions (e.g., [7]). Some other studies examine information revelation issues in buyer-determined auctions (e.g., [34]- [36]).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Online Service Outsourcing Auctions With Endogenous Reviews

Chen

2020

IEEE Access

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“…sealed-bid buyer-determined auctions (e.g., [7]). Some other studies examine information revelation issues in buyer-determined auctions (e.g., [34]- [36]).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Online Service Outsourcing Auctions With Endogenous Reviews

Chen

2020

IEEE Access

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“…In order to better understand the role of private information on costs and its impact on the buyer's optimal policy, in this section, we consider a model—developed by Colucci et al. () (CDV henceforth)—in which suppliers' costs

(c_{1}, c_{2})

are common knowledge as in GGD, but

c_{1} = c_{2} + Δ

for some

Δ > 0

.…”

Section: A Setting With Commonly Known Asymmetric Costsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Colucci et al. () assume that suppliers have heterogeneous but commonly known costs (their main results are described in Section ), but in many contexts, each firm has private information on the own actual cost. For instance, differences in costs may reflect different outcomes of technological bets.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, the empirical literature emphasizes large differences in firms' productivity levels, and consequently in firms' costs, even within narrowly defined industries: see Syverson (2004), for example. 2 Colucci et al (2014) assume that suppliers have heterogeneous but commonly known costs (their main results are described in Section 3), but in many contexts, each firm has private information on the own actual cost. For instance, differences in costs may reflect different outcomes of technological bets.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Information Revelation in Procurement Auctions with Two‐Sided Asymmetric Information

Doni

Menicucci

2014

Economics Manag Strategy

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A buyer needs to procure a good from one of two suppliers offering differentiated products and with privately observed costs. The buyer privately observes the own valuations for the products and (ex ante) decides how much of this information should be revealed to suppliers before they play a first score auction. Our main result is that the more significant is each supplier's private information on the own cost, the less information the buyer should reveal. We also examine the buyer's incentives to make untruthful announces.

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“…In economic analysis, uncertainty is associated with risk. In auctions, bidders and sellers usually encounter uncertainty [8,32]. Pratt [25] formally proposed the concept of risk aversion to explain the agent's behavior in uncertain situations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reserve price of risk-averse search engine in keyword auctions with advertisers’ endogenous investment

et al. 2021

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Motivated by vigorous development of keyword auctions, this paper analyzes the reserve price policies in keyword auction with advertisers’ endogenous investment and risk-averse search engine. We explore advertisers’ optimal investment and equilibrium bidding strategies , and derive the determination functions where utility-maximizing reserve price and efficient reserve price which maximizes the social welfare satisfy respectively. The results show that advertisers’ equilibrium bidding is monotonously increasing in bidders’ valuations, the number of advertisers, as well as the reserve price. Meanwhile, advertisers’ optimal investment is negatively correlated with reserve price and the number of advertisers. By numerical examples, the utility-maximizing reserve price decreases with the risk aversion parameter and the number of advertisers. Search engine’s expected utility increases with risk aversion parameter and decreases with the number of advertisers. Moreover, we declare that search engine can use reserve price as a regulatory tool to increase the utility. But there is an upper bound on search engine’s utility. It is interesting to find the efficient reserve price equals to zero. Hence there is a trade-off between total efficiency and search engine’s utility by search engine that has incentive to withhold reserve price that would benefit social welfare.

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Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers

Cited by 7 publications

References 24 publications

Online Service Outsourcing Auctions With Endogenous Reviews

Online Service Outsourcing Auctions With Endogenous Reviews

Information Revelation in Procurement Auctions with Two‐Sided Asymmetric Information

Reserve price of risk-averse search engine in keyword auctions with advertisers’ endogenous investment

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