Information Design

Taneva, Ina

doi:10.1257/mic.20170351

Cited by 87 publications

(51 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Remark II.4 (Stackelberg v.s. Nash Equilibrium) The optimization problem of (9) is a Bayesian persuasion game [6], [16] also referred to as Information Design problem [9], [10], [11]. This corresponds July 16, 2018 DRAFT to a Stackelberg equilibrium [7] in which the encoder is the leader and the decoder is the follower, unlike the Nash equilibrium [8] in which the two devices choose their strategy simultaneously.…”

Section: B Bayesian Persuasion Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This subtle change of rules of the game induces a very different equilibrium solution related to Stackelberg equilibrium [7], instead of Nash equilibrium [8]. This problem was later referred to as "information design" in [9], [10], [11]. In most of the articles in the Economics literature, the transmission between the sender and the receiver is noise-free; except the following ones [12], [13], [14] where the noisy transmission is investigated in a finite block-length regime.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Information-Theoretic Limits of Strategic Communication

Treust

Tomala

2018

SSRN Journal

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In this article, we investigate strategic information transmission over a noisy channel. This problem has been widely investigated in Economics, when the communication channel is perfect. Unlike in Information Theory, both encoder and decoder have distinct objectives and choose their encoding and decoding strategies accordingly. This approach radically differs from the conventional Communication paradigm, which assumes transmitters are of two types: either they have a common goal, or they act as opponent, e.g. jammer, eavesdropper. We formulate a point-to-point source-channel coding problem with state information, in which the encoder and the decoder choose their respective encoding and decoding strategies in order to maximize their long-run utility functions. This strategic coding problem is at the interplay between Wyner-Ziv's scenario and the Bayesian persuasion game of Kamenica-Gentzkow. We characterize a single-letter solution and we relate it to the previous results by using the concavification method. This confirms the benefit of sending encoded data bits even if the decoding process is not supervised, e.g. when the decoder is an autonomous device. Our solution has two interesting features: it might be optimal not to use all channel resources; the informational content impacts the encoding process, since utility functions capture preferences on source symbols. * Maël Le Treust gratefully acknowledges the support of the Labex MME-DII (ANR11-LBX-0023-01) and the DIM-RFSI of the Région Île-de-France, under grant EX032965.† Tristan Tomala gratefully acknowledges the support of the HEC foundation and ANR/Investissements d'Avenir under grant ANR-11-IDEX-0003/Labex Ecodec/ANR-11-LABX-0047.

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Section: B Bayesian Persuasion Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information-Theoretic Limits of Strategic Communication

Treust

Tomala

2018

SSRN Journal

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“…Recently, Taneva (2015) has extended the Bayesian persuasion framework to consider environments with multiple agents (receivers). The principal seeks to commit to a disclosure rule such that the resulting Bayes Nash equilibrium maximizes her expected utility.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic (In)Consistency and the Value of Information

Jakobsen

2018

SSRN Journal

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“…Allowing negative values of p can decrease the cost for the buyer but requires an assumption of perfect contractibility and verifiability of the realized states of the world, here the value of the buyer's demand. We discard this possibility for the sake of realism, but this would reinforce the strength of our early contracting mechanism.18 This is reminiscent of the recent literature on information design; see, for example,Taneva (2015). C The RAND Corporation 2017.…”

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confidence: 97%

An offer you can't refuse: early contracting with endogenous threat

Pouyet

Sand‐Zantman

2017

The RAND J of Economics

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A seller has private information on the future gains from trade with a buyer, but the buyer has the option to invest to produce the good internally. Both the buyer and the seller can efficiently trade ex post under complete information. Despite the lack of information, the buyer sometimes gains by making an early contract offer to the seller. The early contract divides the different types of sellers according to their information, which renders the threat of producing the good in‐house credible and enables the buyer to extract a larger share of the gains from trade. Several extensions are investigated.

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Information Design

Cited by 87 publications

References 15 publications

Information-Theoretic Limits of Strategic Communication

Information-Theoretic Limits of Strategic Communication

Dynamic (In)Consistency and the Value of Information

An offer you can't refuse: early contracting with endogenous threat

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