Information Collection and Personalized Service Strategy of Monopoly under Consumer Misrepresentation
Mingyue Zhong,
Yan Cheng,
Shu-e Mei
et al.
Abstract:To decrease privacy risks, consumers may choose to misrepresent themselves when they are asked to offer personal information. Using a game theoretic model, this study examines the impact of consumer misrepresentation on both a monopolistic firm and consumers. The results show that consumer misrepresentation may benefit the firm, but hurt consumers under certain conditions. In addition, we find that when the unit cost of personalized service is low, consumer misrepresentation may encourage the firm to provide a… Show more
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