Information Choice in Auctions

Bobkova, Nina

doi:10.1145/3391403.3399530

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Bergemann and Bonatti (2015) models the problem of a data provider who sells cookies to match the firms with customers, and explores the set of possible outcomes can be implemented by in a monopoly model by providing the segmentations of the customers. Bergemann et al (2017) and Bobkova (2020) consider the implications of information in given auctions such as the first price auction. See the survey of Bergemann and Bonatti (2019) for a throughout discussion on the information in markets.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information

Li¹

2021

Preprint

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We consider the model of the data broker selling information to a single agent to maximize his revenue. The agent has private valuation for the additional information, and upon receiving the signal from the data broker, the agent can conduct her own experiment to refine her posterior belief on the states with additional costs. In this paper, we show that in the optimal mechanism, there is no distortion at the top and the agent has no incentive to acquire any additional costly information under equilibrium. Still, the ability to acquire additional information distorts the incentives of the agent, and reduces the optimal revenue of the data broker. Finally, we show that posting a deterministic price on fully revealing the states is optimal when the prior distribution is sufficiently informative. * The author is grateful for Rad Niazadeh and Boli Xu for helpful comments.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information

Li¹

2021

Preprint

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“…Information Design We also relate to the literature in information design in mechanisms. Contrary to our setting, the literature focuses on a buyer and seller relationship, see Condorelli and Szentes (2020), Roesler and Szentes (2017), Bobkova (2019). Additionally, in these settings, the buyer (our worker) can make a costly investment or an information choice, which the seller (our employer) takes as given.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Discrimination in Promotion

Prummer

2020

SSRN Journal

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Why do women hit the glass ceiling? Women are hired, but then fail to rise through the ranks. We propose a novel explanation for this pattern, namely preference-and belief-free discrimination. In our setting, an employer can increase effort by inducing differential value distributions for a promotion across workers, who compete for the promotion by exerting effort. Initially, workers possess the same distribution of valuations. Introducing inequality between workers makes them more recognisable, reducing their information rent, which in turn increases effort. However, higher inequality reduces competition. If value is redistributed, the reduction in information rent outweighs the loss in competitiveness, making discrimination between workers optimal.

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The role of information in auctions

Atakan,

Ekmekci

2024

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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Information Choice in Auctions

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information

Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information

Discrimination in Promotion

The role of information in auctions

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