2014
DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2014.29
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Informal sector dynamics in times of fragile growth: The case of Madagascar

Abstract: This paper investigates the dynamics of the informal sector in Madagascar during a period of fragile growth. Overall, the behavior of informal firms in terms of earnings, employment and capital accumulation points to a degree of heterogeneity which goes beyond a simple dualistic model and even a more refined model that would distinguish between an upper entrepreneurial and a lower subsistence tier within the informal sector. However, in line with the dualistic model, the informal sector indeed fulfils a labor … Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…The regressions for the formal and informal NFHBs exhibit somewhat sector-specific patterns. First, note that the elasticities of labour and capital are of the same magnitude as those estimated in various countries, in particular for African informal firms (see Vaillant et al, 2014). The pooled OLS Cobb-Douglas regressions (column (A)) show significant differences in the elasticities of family and hired labour, for both sectors: a one percent increase in the number of hired (respectively family) workers leads to a 65 (21) percent increase in the formal NFHBs' annual value added.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 70%
“…The regressions for the formal and informal NFHBs exhibit somewhat sector-specific patterns. First, note that the elasticities of labour and capital are of the same magnitude as those estimated in various countries, in particular for African informal firms (see Vaillant et al, 2014). The pooled OLS Cobb-Douglas regressions (column (A)) show significant differences in the elasticities of family and hired labour, for both sectors: a one percent increase in the number of hired (respectively family) workers leads to a 65 (21) percent increase in the formal NFHBs' annual value added.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 70%
“…Interestingly, in the period of growth (1998)(1999)(2000)(2001), although dependent informal labour was absorbed in formal enterprises, the absolute number of firms continued to increase, even faster than the overall growth of the employed labour force. This suggests that the informal sector consists of both workers queuing for a formal job and voluntary entrepreneurs (Vaillant et al, 2011). Conversely, in the period of crisis and the following recovery, the decrease in formal employment seems to have been mainly compensated by an increase in informal independent labour (the share in total employment increases from 35% to 38.6%), rather than informal hired or family labour, suggesting that existing firms…”
Section: Contextmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Again, this would mean that informal self-employed workers have an advantage in terms of their unobserved productive characteristics (probably in terms of their entrepreneurial skills), which produces an overestimation of the premium associated with being an informal selfemployed worker compared to exerting as a formal wage worker if this individual heterogeneity is not accounted for. We nevertheless should be cautious before claiming that the exit option may be at stake, as the self-employed earnings may be overestimated for at least two reasons: first, the measure of earnings we computed remunerates both labour and capital factors (mixed income), the latter being far from negligible in the informal sector (Vaillant et al, 2011); second, the self-employed earnings include the share which should be attributed to the productive contribution of unpaid family workers. As we do not have any order of magnitude of these two phenomena, it is difficult to exclude the possibility that the premium we obtain may not turn into a penalty, once these two factors are taken into account.…”
Section: Formal Wage Vs Informal Self-employed Workersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…where i z is household income and p is the relative price of gifts, which is usually higher than 1. Many gifts are in-kind, but selling gifts for cash is limited due to social norms and related reasons (Vaillant et al 2014).…”
Section: A Simple Model Of Gift Competitionmentioning
confidence: 99%