Informal networks and judicial decisions: Insights from the Supreme Court of the Philippines, 1986–2015

Abstract

To what extent do informal networks shape the decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippines? Though often raised in the Philippines, this question has never been studied empirically. To answer it, we constructed a set of social network variables to assess how informal ties, based on university connections and work affiliations, may have influenced the court's decisions between 1986 and 2015 in 47 politically high-profile cases. Providing statistically significant evidence for the effects of political influence (presidential appointments) and hierarchical pressure (the vote of the Chief Justice) on related networks, our analysis suggests a continuing tension on the Supreme Court bench between professionalism and informality. Because the findings advance both theoretical and empirical understanding of larger issues at the intersection of courts and society throughout the region, we recommend more attention to the role of judicial networks, external to the courts as well as within them.

Courts and informal networks: Towards a relational perspective on judicial politics outside Western democracies

“…Basabe-Serrano, 2015; Popova, 2012; Sanchez Urribarri, 2011). For example, in this issue, Dressel and Inoue (2018) explain how political or hierarchical pressures on judges from the executive or chief justice, transmitted via professional or university networks, influence judicial decision-making when the government is party to a case before the Supreme Court of the Philippines.…”

“…The article by Björn Dressel and Tomoo Inoue similarly employs formal SNA to assess how informal ties, based on university and work connections, help to explain high-profile decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Providing statistically significant evidence of the effects of political (presidential) and hierarchical (Chief Justice) pressure that these networks transmit to the bench, they suggest that a continuing tension between informality and professionalism comes to inform their decisions, particularly in high-profile political cases (Dressel and Inoue, 2018).…”

Justices and Political Loyalties: An Empirical Investigation of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, 1987–2020

“…Most of these accounts explicitly acknowledge the importance of informal dynamics, such as presidential influence on nominations and court stacking; the personal characteristics that shape judicial leadership; or patterns of obligation, friendship, and loyalty to political actors that influence how justices decide cases. Nevertheless, evidence to support these dynamics has been largely anecdotal (although see Dressel and Inoue 2018).…”

“…There is a perception that its justices are susceptible to partisanship due to a sense of loyalty born out of gratitude for their appointment to the Court (Agabin 2012, 21–22). Meanwhile, the 2012 impeachment of Chief Justice (CJ) Renato Corona and the 2018 removal of CJ Sereno via a quo warranto writ are reminders that the SC is vulnerable to executive pressures (Dressel and Inoue 2018).…”

The Informal Dimension of Judicial Politics: A Relational Perspective

“…Courts have become central to political life throughout the world. Yet despite a growing body of scholarship (e.g., Dressel 2012, Ginsburg & Moustafa 2008, Helmke & Rios-Figueroa 2011, Kapiszewski et al 2013, Sieder et al 2005, there is still considerable debate about the conditions in non-Western countries that support courts in holding political authorities accountable and contributing to democratic consolidation. More recently, excitement about courts as champions of liberty in developing democracies seems to have waned; despite their formal duties some courts not only are failing to help consolidate democracy and fulfill the expectations generated by institutional reforms but are even becoming tools of political elites (Ellett 2013, Popova 2012, Trochev 2011.…”