The movement of influenza A viruses (IAVs) from wild bird reservoirs to domestic animals and humans is well established, but the transmission mechanisms that facilitate efficient movement across and within these host populations are not fully defined. Although predominant routes of transmission vary between host populations, the extent of environmental stability needed for efficient IAV transmission also may vary. Because of this, we hypothesized that virus stability would differ in response to varied host-related transmission mechanisms; if correct, such phenotypic variation might represent a potential marker for the emergence of novel animal or human influenza viruses. Here, the objective was to evaluate the ability of eight swine and six human IAV isolates to remain infective under various pH, temperature, and salinity conditions using a preestablished distilled water system. Swine and human viruses persisted longest at near-neutral pH, at cold temperatures, or under "freshwater" conditions. Additionally, no significant differences in persistence were observed between pandemic and nonpandemic IAVs. Our results indicate that there have been no apparent changes in the environmental stability of the viruses related to host adaptation.
IMPORTANCEThis study assessed the environmental stability of eight swine and six human influenza A viruses (IAVs), including viruses associated with the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, in a distilled water system. The important findings of this work are that IAV persistence can be affected by environmental variables and that no marked changes were noted between human and swine IAVs or between pandemic and nonpandemic IAVs.
Influenza A viruses (IAVs) have been isolated from numerous avian and mammalian hosts, and cross-species transmission commonly occurs between wild bird reservoirs, domestic animals, and humans (1). Swine are susceptible to infection by IAVs of both avian and mammalian origin (2) and are recognized as an intermediate host for the evolution and adaptation of IAVs with pandemic potential (1, 2). From 1930 to 1990, classic H1N1 swine influenza virus (SIV) underwent little genetic change, but by the late 1990s, the "triple-reassortant" SIV viruses H1N1, H3N2, and H1N2 had become predominant in swine in North America (3, 4).The pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus (pH1N1) was first detected in April 2009 in two human cases in California (2009), and it quickly spread across the world. The emergence of this virus was subsequently traced to the reassortment of recent North American avian/human/swine triple-reassortant viruses with Eurasian swine viruses (5). This virus has since infected swine and continues to reassort with other SIVs (6, 7); pH1N1 is now a part of the endemic human influenza pool (8).The potential for viruses such as pH1N1 to emerge as a result of reassortment between human, swine, and avian viruses involves unlikely transmission events. Transmission mechanisms for IAVs not only are poorly understood in all of these host systems but also vary between them. With b...