Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight

Abstract

Does the president or Congress have more influence over policymaking by the bureaucracy? Despite a wealth of theoretical guidance, progress on this important question has proven elusive due to competing theoretical predictions and severe difficulties in measuring agency influence and oversight. We use a survey of federal executives to assess political influence, congressional oversight, and the policy preferences of agencies, committees, and the president on a comparable scale. Analyzing variation in political influence across and within agencies reveals that Congress is less influential relative to the White House when more committees are involved. While increasing the number of involved committees may maximize the electoral benefits for members, it may also undercut the ability of Congress as an institution to collectively respond to the actions of the presidency or the bureaucracy.

Who Controls the Immigration Bureaucracy? The Relative Influence of the Three Branches Over Asylum Policy Implementation

“…On the other hand, investigations of Congress' attempts to alter asylum decision-making through the REAL ID Act indicated a gap between intentions and outcomes, and that the explanation for this result is complicated (Miller et al, 2015a). Furthermore, Congress clearly suffers from collective action problems in attempting to monitor bureaucratic performance (Clinton, Lewis, and Selin 2014;Gailmard, 2009). We therefore assume that IJs will, in general, be responsive to the conservative/liberal majority in Congress, but that such response is likely weak.…”

“…Further, it has developed an extensive committee system through which to manage its oversight of the executive branch (e.g. Aberbach, 1990;Adler, 2002;Clinton et al, 2014;Mayhew, 1974;Weingast & Moran, 1982, 1983, and a number of scholars have long theorized that agencies wisely react to legislative preferences as a result (e.g. Fiorina, 1981;McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984;Weingast, 1984;Weingast & Moran, 1982, 1983.…”

“…As is clear from this discussion, and as is the case with most bureaucratic actors, even nominally independent ones, IJs must deal with a complicated multiple principals dynamic, wherein they receive signals from an array of sources, which can seriously complicate bureaucrats' expectations (e.g. Clinton et al, 2014;Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999;Gailmard, 2009;Hammond & Knott, 1996;McCarty, 2004;McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987;Moe, 1984;Wood & Waterman, 1993). Though the discretion afforded IJs is considerable, at least statutorily, there are still good reasons to expect that those in the immigration bureaucracy are exposed to the same political pressures that other bureaucrats encounter.…”

Keeping tabs on the executive

“…Regardless of definition or operationalization, a consistent theme in scholarship is that oversight is an attempt to make executive agencies and officials more accountable to Congress (Dodd & Schott, 1979; Selin, 2022). Scholars regularly equate oversight with congressional efforts to control executive action and to serve the legislature's political interests by detecting and resolving executive divergence from legislative preferences (Aberbach, 1990; Clinton et al, 2014; Lowande, 2018; McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). In this sense, scholarly conceptions of oversight are consistent with its constitutional purpose, broadly construed—to supervise how the executive branch spends public funds.…”

“…and to serve the legislature's political interests by detecting and resolving executive divergence from legislative preferences (Aberbach, 1990;Clinton et al, 2014;Lowande, 2018;McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). In this sense, scholarly conceptions of oversight are consistent with its constitutional purpose, broadly construed-to supervise how the executive branch spends public funds.…”