2014
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0099841
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Influences of Agents with a Self-Reputation Awareness Component in an Evolutionary Spatial IPD Game

Abstract: Iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) researchers have shown that strong positive reputations plus an efficient reputation evaluation system encourages both sides to pursue long-term collaboration and to avoid falling into mutual defection cycles. In agent-based environments with reliable reputation rating systems, agents interested in maximizing their private interests must show concern for other agents as well as their own self-reputations–an important capability that standard IPD game agents lack. Here we prese… Show more

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References 38 publications
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