Influence of external authorities on collaborative frictions

Abstract

When institutional frictions threaten to disrupt collaborations, an external authority can be brought in to resolve disputes. How effective is such external imposition? What are the institutional circumstances in which it works? Framed by the collaborative governance regime (CGR), which sees established procedures and institutions as a critical collaborative capacity, this research employs a unique concept-collaborative friction-to explore the role of external imposition in collaboration among entities with significant institutional differences. We examined 965 recorded collaborative frictions from four large collaborative infrastructure projects between governments in Hong Kong and mainland China. Our finding suggests a significant, but limited, effect of the central government's imposition on collaborative frictions. We also find a significant role of sociopolitical circumstances in collaboration. Based on the findings, we make several theoretical propositions articulating external imposition's role in collaboration. Evidence for practice• A large number of collaborative frictions can occur when collaborating institutions with different governing procedures and institutions interact. • The engagement of an external authority may improve collaboration through reducing collaborative frictions in short term. • External imposition may not necessarily improve collaboration in long term.• Controversial political issues could increase the difficulty for collaboration through creating or augmenting frictions in collaborating institutions. • Controversial political issues could also make the external authority's engagement in collaboration difficult to achieve expected outcomes.

Confronting Uncertainty and Change: Challengers or Champions?

“…Only a balanced representation of coproducers exhibits a positive treatment effect on citizens' willingness to coproduce, contrary to core arguments from the representative bureaucracy literature. Zhao, et Al (2023) employ the concept of collaborative friction to explore the role of external imposition in collaboration among entities with significant institutional differences. They analyzed 965 recorded collaborative frictions emerging from collaborative infrastructure projects between governments in Hong Kong and mainland China, finding a significant, but limited, effect of the central government's imposition on collaborative frictions.…”

Reputation, Network, and Performance: Exploring the Diffusion Mechanism of Local Governments’ Behavior during Inter-Governmental Environmental Cooperation

“…In the field of environmental governance, although inter-governmental cooperation could effectively break through the restrictions posed by administrative divisions to address cross-regional pollution problems [8], collaborative frictions still appear among differential local governments [9], which could be influenced by the conflict between top-down pressure and local self-interest [10], as well as local favoritism behaviors during regional cooperation [11]. Specifically manifested as conspicuous collaboration risks and transaction costs, these might result in a campaign-style environmental governance effect [12].…”