Influence in Corporate Networks: An Examination of Four Measures

Mizruchi, Mark S.; Bunting, David

doi:10.2307/2392519

Cited by 66 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Typically, such people are members of the board of several companies, see e.g., Mizruchi and Bunting [19] and Conyon and Muldoon [11]. Besides the influence that a board member has on a company, it is interesting to know what influence board members have on each other when they are member of the board of the same company.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Harsanyi Power Solutions for Games on Union Stable Systems

2011

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Harsanyi Power Solutions for Games on Union Stable Systems

2011

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“…The most common measure of the position of an individual unit is the centrality measure and the debate concerning different definitions and aspects of the centrality measure is extensive. In this short review, some examples are given of studies based on historical material f (Yamagishi, Gillmore & Cook 1988;Roy & Bonacich 1988;Mizruchi & Bunting 1981). Mizruchi & Bunting argued that more sophisticated centrality measures better predicted the real influence over companies, based on conditions in the USA in 1904 (Mizruchi & Bunting 1981).…”

Section: Methods and Sourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interlocking Directorates in Swedish Big Business in the Early 20th Century

Ottosson

1997

Acta Sociologica

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“…According to Mizruchi & Bunting (1981), the causes and consequences of interlocking boards have been a source of debate since the Pujo Committee identified interlocking as a problem of corporate concentration in the early twentieth century. However, critics of research into interlocking boards have argued that interlocking boards are largely irrelevant and that research on the interlocking network represents the dominance of method over substance (Stinchcombe, 1990, cited in Davis, 1996.…”

Section: Previous Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social capital, networks and interlocked independent directors: a Mexican case

Avina-Vazquez

Uddin

2016

Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether a pattern of interlocking directorates is emerging following reforms in Mexican corporations, and who, if any, are the powerful actors in this network. Drawing on the Bourdieusian notion of social capital, the paper also analyses theoretically the interlocking directorates, networks and powerful actors, and their influences on and potential implications for corporate governance mechanisms. Design/methodology/approach – The data used in the study consisted of 1,442 internal and external board members of the population of 126 Mexican corporations trading on the Mexican Stock Market as of January 2011. Use of social network analysis (SNA) demonstrates individuals’ links with corporations and allows the production of spatial maps to visualise the network structure of interlocking boards. Findings – Using the measures of SNA developed by Freeman (1979 and Bonacich (1972), the authors identify the most powerful and influential directors in the network structure of board members in Mexico. Board members with the greatest number of connections occupy central positions in the network. The authors also find a catalogue of corporate governance scandals. The inclusion of independent directors seems to have had no influence in ensuring better corporate governance. Research limitations/implications – Mapping out the directors’ links might offer excellent opportunities for policy makers to see how many companies a single director represents, how they share boards, and the implications for minority shareholders of sharing boards, and to understand the workloads of directors in carrying out the monitoring tasks expected of them. Originality/value – This paper makes an important contribution by employing SNA to illustrate interlocking directorates and the positions of powerful and influential actors. Examining networks of directors from a “social capital” point of view also provides an understanding of why the role of independent directors remains toothless in family-dominated corporations.

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Influence in Corporate Networks: An Examination of Four Measures

Cited by 66 publications

References 29 publications

Harsanyi Power Solutions for Games on Union Stable Systems

Harsanyi Power Solutions for Games on Union Stable Systems

Interlocking Directorates in Swedish Big Business in the Early 20th Century

Social capital, networks and interlocked independent directors: a Mexican case

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