Inflation -- who cares? Monetary Policy in Times of Low Attention

Abstract

Based on a model of optimal information acquisition, I propose an approach to measure attention to inflation in the data. Applying this approach to US consumers and professional forecasters provides substantial evidence that attention to inflation in the US decreased significantly over the last five decades. Consistent with the theoretical model, attention covaries positively with inflation volatility and persistence. To examine the consequences of limited attention for monetary policy, I augment the standard New Keynesian model with a lower-bound constraint on the nominal interest rate and inflation expectations that are characterized by limited attention. Accounting for the lower bound fundamentally alters the normative implications of declining attention. While lower attention raises welfare absent the lower-bound constraint, it decreases welfare when accounting for the lower bound. In fact, limited attention can lead to inflation-attention traps: prolonged periods of a binding lower bound and low inflation due to slowly-adjusting inflation expectations. To prevent these traps, it is optimal to increase the inflation target as attention declines.