Inflation versus filling-in: why we feel we see more than we actually do in peripheral vision

Abstract

Do we perceive fine details in the visual periphery? Here, we propose that phenomenology in the visual periphery can be characterized by an sense of perceptual capacity, as observers overestimate the quality of their perceptual inputs. Distinct from the well-known perceptual phenomenon of 'filling-in' where perceptual content is generated or completed endogenously, inflation can be characterized by incorrect introspection at the subjective level. The perceptual content itself may be absent or weak (i.e. not necessarily filled-in), and yet such content is mistakenly regarded by the system as rich. Behaviourally, this can be reflected by deficits in the degree to which confidence judgements track task accuracy, and biases for observers to think particular items are present, even when they are not. In two experiments using paradigms that exploit unique attributes of peripheral vision (crowding and summary statistics), we provide evidence that both types of deficits are present in peripheral vision, as observers' reports are marked by overconfidence in discrimination judgements and high numbers of false alarms in detection judgements. We discuss potential mechanisms that may be the cause of inflation and propose future experiments to further explore this unique sensory phenomenon.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Subjective inflation: phenomenology’s get-rich-quick scheme

“…Inflation was also recently observed in both peripheral summary statistics and crowding tasks [10] . In the latter task, in contrast to previous effects indexed by shifts in detection criteria, inflation was indexed by an increase in confidence ratings on incorrect trials for crowded compared to uncrowded stimuli.…”

“…We highlight an approach that, instead of attempting to investigate visual phenomenology in the complete or near-complete absence of attention, exploits the fact that attention is graded, and investigates the interaction between attention and phenomenology. Such an approach consistently reveals a phenomenon known as subjective inflation , wherein study participants exhibit liberal detection criteria or are overly confident when evaluating minimally attended or peripheral stimuli [10] . We argue, in line with [10] , that this can explain the subjective impression of richness across the visual field appealed to by Block [12] , while accounting for both behavioral [23][24][25][26] and physiological [38,39] limitations in minimally attended perception, all without invoking phenomenological overflow.…”

“…There is a longstanding and currently lively debate about whether or not visual phenomenology overflows cognitive access (see recent themed issue of Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10] ). The question of phenomenological overflow is often rephrased as asking whether phenomenology is rich or sparse.…”

Prediction shapes peripheral appearance

“…Albeit speculative, one alternative way of looking at this phenomenon is to consider it one result of the predictive mechanisms that supplement the impoverished representation of our peripheral visual field, along with foveal-to-peripheral extrapolation (Otten et al, 2016;Toscani et al, 2017) and transsaccadic learning (Bosco et al, 2015;Herwig, 2015;Herwig et al, 2015;Valsecchi & Gegenfurtner, 2016;Weiß et al, 2014). The predictive nature of peripheral vision might subsume other phenomena such as the tendency to show liberal criteria for detecting peripheral targets (Solovey, Graney, & Lau, 2015) and the tendency to be overconfident in peripheral perceptual judgments (Li, Lau, & Odegaard, 2018;Odegaard, Chang, Lau, & Cheung, 2018). Such predictive mechanisms could be useful in reducing the perceptual discrepancy that we experience as we move our eyes.…”

Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access: an introduction

“…If the content of perceptual consciousness is richer than the content that can be cognitively accessed, then consciousness overflows access and thus access cannot be necessary for consciousness. This part confronts empirical reasons for thinking that conscious perception is rich [28] with reasons for thinking that it is sparser than often thought [29,30].…”