2020
DOI: 10.1002/asjc.2371
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Infinite horizon LQ Nash Games for SDEs with infinite jumps

Abstract: In this paper, we consider infinite horizon linear-quadratic (LQ) Nash games for stochastic differential equations (SDEs) with infinite Markovian jumps and (x, u, v)-dependent noise. An indefinite stochastic LQ result is first derived for the considered system. Then, under the condition of strong detectability, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium is put forward in terms of the solvability of a countably infinite set of coupled generalized algebraic Riccati equations (IC… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…If the infinite horizon cost function is concerned, it is much more challenging owing to the requirement of stabilization limitation for the closed-loop system. As discussed in [26], the infinite horizon LQ Nash game has been considered.…”
Section: Nash Equilibrium Pointsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…If the infinite horizon cost function is concerned, it is much more challenging owing to the requirement of stabilization limitation for the closed-loop system. As discussed in [26], the infinite horizon LQ Nash game has been considered.…”
Section: Nash Equilibrium Pointsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Remark 5. By comparing Theorem 1 with Theorem 2, surely the existence of Nash equilibrium points and the solvability of finite horizon H 2 /H ∞ control are not equivalent for system (1), which differs from the continuous-time case as described in [26]. The main cause of the inequivalence lies in that the condition H 1 (t, ς, Λ 1 ) > 0 of Equation (35) cannot meet the Nash equilibrium problem, namely, L T < γ is not equivalent to L T ≤ γ.…”
Section: Remarkmentioning
confidence: 99%
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