Inferring as a way of knowing

Koziolek, Nicholas

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1632-4

Cited by 12 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…See also (White, 1971). I will work towards this view by engaging with the ongoing debate about whether inference requires that the reasoner 'takes' her premises to support her conclusion (Valaris, 2014;McHugh and Way, 2016;Koziolek, 2017;Boghossian, 2018;Siegel, 2018). I will argue that it does, and I will offer an account of the 'taking.'…”

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confidence: 99%

Inferring by Attaching Force

Hlobil¹

2019

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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The paper offers an account of inference. The account underwrites the idea that inference requires that the reasoner takes her premises to support her conclusion. I reject views according to which such 'takings' are intuitions or beliefs. I sketch an alternative view on which inferring consists in attaching what I call inferential force to a structured collection of contents. Suppose you know that Tiara is either in Paris or in New York. You learn that Tiara is not in Paris, and you infer that she is in New York. What were you doing when you inferred this conclusion? More generally: What are we doing when we make inferences? 1 I suggest that inference should be understood in parallel to judgment. Judgment is an act of attaching what I

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confidence: 99%

Inferring by Attaching Force

Hlobil¹

2019

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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“…On the alternative intuitional construal of the Taking Condition, the taking at issue is an intuition or seeming (Dogramaci, 2013;Chudnoff, 2014;Broome, 2014). A third position, which I call "skepticism about takings," rejects the Taking Condition either by saying that there are inferences that don't involve takings (McHugh and Way, 2016;Wright, 2014;Winters, 1983) or by saying that even if (or when) inferences involve takings, the subject is not drawing her conclusion because of the taking (Koziolek, 2017;Mercier and Sperber, 2017). A fourth position accepts the Taking Condition but holds that the taking at issue is neither a belief nor an intuition (Boghossian, 2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Subpersonal or unconscious information processing does not count as reasoning or inferring, 1 for the purposes of this paper. By the same token, my topic doesn't include what some call "non-self-conscious inferences" (Koziolek, 2017), "intuitive inferences" (Mercier and Sperber, 2017), "bare inferential transitions" (Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum, 2017), and the like. What I say in this paper may have interesting implications for these other topics, but I will leave that for another occasion.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

We cannot infer by accepting testimony

Hlobil

2018

Philos Stud

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“…Korcz (2000) holds that causation in the right way is necessary but not sufficient for epistemic. The Causal Theory is also popular with respect to drawing a conclusion on the basis of premises (Blake‐Turner, 2020; Boghossian, 2014; Koziolek, 2017; Longino, 1978), but for dissent about deduction see Valaris (2014) and Marcus (2020). Anscombe (1963) is standardly read as denying the Causal Theory with respect to practical basing (D’Oro & Sandis, 2013, 18; Singh, forthcoming; Stoutland, 2011, 26).…”

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Acting and believing on the basis of reasons

Blake‐Turner

2021

Philosophy Compass

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This paper provides an opinionated guide to discussions of acting and believing on the basis of reasons. I aim to bring closer together largely separate literatures in practical reason and in epistemology. I focus on three questions. First, is basing causing? Causal theories of basing remain popular despite the notorious Problem of Deviant Causal Chains. Causal theorists in both the epistemic and practical domains have begun to appeal to dispositions to try and solve the problem. Second, how unified are acting and believing on the basis of reasons? I consider an important challenge to their unity due to Setiya. I sketch a response, which posits unity of causal structure across acting and believing on the basis of reasons. Third, how does acting or believing on the basis of a good reason relate to acting or believing on the basis of a reason simpliciter? I generalize a recent argument of Lord and Sylvan's to include acting as well as believing. The conclusion is that, for both believing and acting, φing on the basis of a good reason does not amount to φing on the basis of a reason that just so happens to be good.

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Inferring as a way of knowing

Cited by 12 publications

References 30 publications

Inferring by Attaching Force

Inferring by Attaching Force

We cannot infer by accepting testimony

Acting and believing on the basis of reasons

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