Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief

Barnett, David

doi:10.1111/nous.12088

Cited by 10 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 62 publications

(76 reference statements)

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“…III. See, e.g., Gibbons 2013, Smithies 2012a, and Shoemaker 1996 34 Wedgwood 2017, pp. 44-46. 35 E.g., Barnett 2016 andMSb, andByrne's (2018, Ch. 4 andSec.…”

Section: Moore's Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox

Barnett

2021

The Philosophical Review

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Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form < p, but I don't believe that p>. If there were nothing irrational about failing to know one's own beliefs, they claim, then there would be nothing irrational about Moore-paradoxical assertions or beliefs. This article considers a few ways the data surrounding Moore's paradox might be marshaled to support rational requirements to know one's beliefs, and finds that none succeed.

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“…III. See, e.g., Gibbons 2013, Smithies 2012a, and Shoemaker 1996 34 Wedgwood 2017, pp. 44-46. 35 E.g., Barnett 2016 andMSb, andByrne's (2018, Ch. 4 andSec.…”

Section: Moore's Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox

Barnett

2021

The Philosophical Review

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“…When this has happened, upon concluding that p at the personal level, S does not represent p as p for her . All that she represents is that p is the case, which is hardly evidence for her that she (or anyone) believes anything because p might be the case even if no one believes it (Barnett, ). Nonetheless, when S reflects on whether she believes that p and concludes that p , then in that situation p serves the mindreading system as input to a purely causally operating detection mechanism (e.g., Nichols and Stich's MM) that then issues the self‐ascription I believe p .…”

Section: From Belief Self‐ascriptions To Non‐inferential Self‐knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Introspection, mindreading, and the transparency of belief

Peters

2018

European J of Philosophy

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This paper explores the nature of self‐knowledge of beliefs by investigating the relationship between self‐knowledge of beliefs and one's knowledge of other people's beliefs. It introduces and defends a new account of self‐knowledge of beliefs according to which this type of knowledge is developmentally interconnected with and dependent on resources already used for acquiring knowledge of other people's beliefs, which is inferential in nature. But when these resources are applied to oneself, one attains and subsequently frequently uses a method for acquiring knowledge of beliefs that is non‐inferential in nature. The paper argues that this account is preferable to some of the most common empirically motivated theories of self‐knowledge of beliefs and explains the origin of the widely discussed phenomenon that our own beliefs are often transparent to us in that we can determine whether we believe that p simply by settling whether p is the case.

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“…There's some discussion of goodness, but none of completeness, in the relevant literature. (For the case of introspection, see e.g Aydede 2003;Barnett 2016;Byrne 2005Byrne , 2011Gallois 1996…”

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confidence: 99%

Goodness, availability, and argument structure

Malmgren

2020

Synthese

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According to a widely shared generic conception of inferential justification-'the standard conception'-an agent is inferentially justified in believing that p only if she has antecedently justified beliefs in all the non-redundant premises of a good argument for p. This conception tends to serve as the starting-point in contemporary debates about the nature and scope of inferential justification: as neutral common ground between various competing, more specific, conceptions. But it's a deeply problematic starting-point. This paper explores three questions that haven't been given the attention they deserve, that complicate the application of the standard conception to cases, and that reveal it to be underspecified at the core-in ways that aren't resolved but inherited by more specific (extant) versions of it. The goal isn't to answer the questions, but to articulate them, explain what turns on them, and invite a critical re-examination of the standard conception. Keywords Epistemology • Inferential justification • Logical form • Argument • Inference[K]nowledge and justification are inferentially transmissible only if the underlying argument is good. If we start with false or unjustified premises or we unreasonably infer a conclusion from them (i.e. infer it invalidly or in an inductively inadmissible way) it's not to be expected that a belief based on the argument in question constitutes knowledge or is even justified. (Audi 2011, 199.) On a widely shared generic conception of inferential justification-henceforth 'the standard conception'-an agent is inferentially justified in believing that p only if she has antecedently justified beliefs in all the non-redundant premises of a good argument for p. This paper explores three questions that haven't been given the attention they deserve, that complicate the application of the standard conception to cases, and that reveal it to be underspecified at the core-in ways not resolved, but inherited, by more B Anna-Sara Malmgren

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Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief

Cited by 10 publications

References 62 publications

Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox

Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox

Introspection, mindreading, and the transparency of belief

Goodness, availability, and argument structure

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