Inference to the Best Legal Explanation

Amaya, Amalia

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2044136

Cited by 13 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 44 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…An explanation‐based approach to legal proof has also been advocated by the American legal scholars Pardo and Allen (2008), although not with a focus on scenarios. Finally, Thagard (2004) has modeled the scenario approach with his connectionist computational theory of explanatory coherence, claiming that it avoids the number problem that is inherent in using Bayesian networks (see also Amaya, 2009). An interesting question is whether these various approaches are pragmatic approximations of Bayesian probability theory or whether they model something intrinsically different than probability (Lipton, 2004).…”

Section: Theories Of Rational Criminal Proofmentioning

confidence: 99%

Editors' Review and Introduction: Models of Rational Proof in Criminal Law

Prakken

Bex

Mackor

2020

Topics in Cognitive Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Decisions concerning proof of facts in criminal law must be rational because of what is at stake, but the decision-making process must also be cognitively feasible because of cognitive limitations, and it must obey the relevant legal-procedural constraints. In this topic three approaches to rational reasoning about evidence in criminal law are compared in light of these demands: arguments, probabilities, and scenarios. This is done in six case studies in which different authors analyze a manslaughter case from different theoretical perspectives, plus four commentaries on these case studies. The aim of this topic is to obtain more insight into how the different approaches can be applied in a legal context. This will advance the discussion on rational reasoning about evidence in law and will contribute more widely to cognitive science on a number of topics, including the value of probabilistic accounts of cognition and the problem of dealing with cognitive biases in reasoning under uncertainty in practical contexts.

show abstract

Section: Theories Of Rational Criminal Proofmentioning

confidence: 99%

Editors' Review and Introduction: Models of Rational Proof in Criminal Law

Prakken

Bex

Mackor

2020

Topics in Cognitive Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…15 2.2.3 Inference to the most coherent explanation. Amaya (2009Amaya ( , 2013 also offers an analysis of the process of coherence maximization. She argues that this process is an explanatory inference, which fits the model of IBE.…”

Section: E7 Acceptancementioning

confidence: 99%

Coherence and probability in legal evidence

Dahlman

Mackor²

2019

Law, Probability and Risk

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The authors investigate to what extent an evaluation of legal evidence in terms of coherence (suggested by Thagard, Amaya, Van Koppen and others) is reconcilable with a probabilistic (Bayesian) approach to legal evidence. The article is written by one author (Dahlman) with a background in the bayesian approach to legal evidence, and one author (Mackor) with a background in scenario theory. The authors find common ground but partly diverge in their conclusions. Their findings give support to the claim (reductionism) that coherence can be translated into probability without loss. Dahlman therefore concludes that the probabilistic vocabulary is superior to the coherence vocabulary, since it is more precise. Mackor is more agnostic in her conclusions about reductionism. In Mackor's view, the findings of their joint investigation do not imply that the probabilistic approach is superior to the coherentist approach.

show abstract

“…For discussions about possible criteria, see, e.g., Harman (1965), Lipton (2004), and Thagard (1978). For discussion about how to evaluate IBE type arguments in legal settings, see, e.g., Schum (2001), Abimbola (2001), Josephson (2001) and Amaya (2009). 29.…”

Section: Descriptive and Normative Inadequaciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Given the relevant role played by the reasoners' interests in determining what constitutes a good explanation, some authors have suggested that there is not just one type of IBE, but, in fact, there are many different types. See Brewer (1998) and Amaya (2009). Examples include: inference to the best factual explanation, inference to the best legal explanation, inference to the best moral explanation, etc.…”

Section: Descriptive and Normative Inadequaciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can there be a burden of the best explanation?

Ribeiro

2018

The International Journal of Evidence & Proof

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this article I address a foundational question in evidence law: how should judges and jurors reason with evidence? According to a widely accepted approach, legal fact-finding should involve a determination of whether each cause of action is proven to a specific probability. In most civil cases, the party carrying the burden of persuasion is said to need to persuade triers that the facts she needs to prevail are “more likely than not” true. The problem is that this approach is both a descriptively and normatively inadequate account of reasoning with evidence in law. It does not offer a plausible picture of how people in general, and legal fact-finders in particular, reason with evidence. And it turns out that if we try to do what the approach tells us, we end up with absurd results. Faced with these difficulties, a group of evidence scholars has proposed an alternative. According to them, legal fact-finding should involve a determination of which hypothesis best explains the admitted evidence, rather than whether each cause of action is proven to a specific probability. My main contributions in this article are twofold. First, I elaborate on the many descriptive, normative and explanatory considerations in support of an explanation-based approach to standards. Second, I offer novel replies to pressing objections against that same approach.

show abstract

Inference to the Best Legal Explanation

Cited by 13 publications

References 44 publications

Editors' Review and Introduction: Models of Rational Proof in Criminal Law

Editors' Review and Introduction: Models of Rational Proof in Criminal Law

Coherence and probability in legal evidence

Can there be a burden of the best explanation?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About