Inference on vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance

Bonnet, Céline; Dubois, Pierre

doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00093.x

Cited by 211 publications

(153 citation statements)

References 42 publications

(55 reference statements)

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“…4 The timing of moves is as follows. First, U bargains with each D i over the terms of a two-part tari¤ contract, i.e., over a wholesale price, w i , and a …xed fee, after observing each other's contract terms.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3 Assuming zero marginal production costs upstream and downstream is without loss of generality. 4 See Singh and Vives (1984) for details regarding the derivation of the demand functions from the representative consumer's utility maximization problem. 5 According to Rey and Vergé's (2004) terminology, we assume that contracts are interim observable.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market

2014

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editor. Cournot competition yields higher output, lower wholesale prices, lower …nal prices, higher consumers'surplus, and higher total welfare than Bertrand competition. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market

2014

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“…We build on the existing literature on multiple-discrete choice (see Hendel (1999), Dubé (2005), Gentzkow (2007)), and discrete-continuous choice (see Dubin and McFadden (1984), Haneman (1984), Smith (2004)). 8 Our multi-category multi-store model brings together the empirical literature that measures market power for a single supermarket category (e.g. Nevo (2001) and Villas Boas (2007)), with the literature on spatial competition between retail outlets in which the choice of category is not modelled (e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-Category Competition and Market Power: A Model of Supermarket Pricing

Thomassen¹,

Smith²,

Seiler

et al. 2017

American Economic Review

130

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In many competitive settings consumers buy multiple product categories, and some prefer to use a single firm, generating complementary cross-category price effects. To study pricing in supermarkets, an organizational form where these effects are internalized, we develop a multi-category multi-seller demand model and estimate it using UK consumer data. This class of model is used widely in theoretical analysis of retail pricing. We quantify crosscategory pricing effects and find that internalizing them substantially reduces market power.We find that consumers inclined to one-stop (rather than multi-stop) shopping have a greater pro-competitive impact because they generate relatively large cross-category effects.

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“…23 For some empirical evidence on resale price maintenance in Europe, we refer to Bonnet and Dubois (2010).…”

Section: Two-part Tariffmentioning

confidence: 99%

The strategic value of partial vertical integration

Fiocco

2016

European Economic Review

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We investigate the strategic incentives for partial vertical integration, namely, partial ownership agreements between manufacturers and retailers, when retailers privately know their costs and engage in differentiated good price competition. The partial misalignment between the profit objectives within a partially integrated manufacturer-retailer hierarchy entails a higher retail price than under full integration. This 'information vertical effect' translates into an opposite 'competition horizontal effect': the partially integrated hierarchy's commitment to a higher price induces the competitor to increase its price, which strategically relaxes competition. Our analysis provides implications for vertical merger policy and theoretical support for the recently documented empirical evidence on partial vertical acquisitions.

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Inference on vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance

Cited by 211 publications

References 42 publications

Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market

Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market

Multi-Category Competition and Market Power: A Model of Supermarket Pricing

The strategic value of partial vertical integration

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