2005
DOI: 10.1126/science.1111656
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Infants' Insight into the Mind: How Deep?

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Cited by 411 publications
(302 citation statements)
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“…First, it supports the theory that humans have two cognitive systems for mentalizing: one early--developing, automatic or 'fast--and--efficient' system (implicit), and a later--developing, controlled 'slow--and--flexible' system (explicit) (Apperly, 2011;Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). Second, it supports the controversial view (Heyes, in press;Moore & Corkum, 1994;Perner, 2010;Perner & Ruffman, 2005), based primarily on eye movement studies, that infants are capable of mentalizing (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010;Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). A range of procedures have been used to provide evidence of implicit mentalizing in adults (Heyes, under review), testing for automatic representation of what others see (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010;Zwickel, 2009), intend (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003), and believe (Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010;Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009).…”
mentioning
confidence: 69%
“…First, it supports the theory that humans have two cognitive systems for mentalizing: one early--developing, automatic or 'fast--and--efficient' system (implicit), and a later--developing, controlled 'slow--and--flexible' system (explicit) (Apperly, 2011;Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). Second, it supports the controversial view (Heyes, in press;Moore & Corkum, 1994;Perner, 2010;Perner & Ruffman, 2005), based primarily on eye movement studies, that infants are capable of mentalizing (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010;Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). A range of procedures have been used to provide evidence of implicit mentalizing in adults (Heyes, under review), testing for automatic representation of what others see (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010;Zwickel, 2009), intend (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003), and believe (Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010;Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009).…”
mentioning
confidence: 69%
“…In this regard, the present results comport with recent findings by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) that 15-month-olds expect an actor to behave according to the actor's belief about the state of the world, even when the actor's belief is false. Perner and Ruffman (2005); also Ruffman and Perner, 2005 suggested that the results of Onishi and Baillargeon sprang from a simple innate rule infants may have, rather than from any mentalistic notion. The proposed rule, that an actor should behave toward an object in the last location in which the actor saw the object, will not account for the present results.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Because belief and pretense (make-believe) are cognate concepts, a looking-time study of pretense could provide background evidence relevant to Onishi and Baillargeon's findings on false belief. For example, Perner and Ruffman (2005) suggested that these findings may have simply reflected infants' expectation that an actor will behave toward the last seen location of an object. Pretend scenarios allow us to test whether infants can form expectations with regard to an actor's pretend intentions toward an object or a property that does not exist and therefore was never seen.…”
Section: Goals Of the Present Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…infants look longer at a scene in which someone acts against the false belief that they should hold concerning an object's location or contents) [12]. Whether these results tap the same socio-cognitive skill that 4-5 year-olds use to solve the Sally -Anne task is a matter of debate; for example, the babies may expect people to search for objects where they saw them last and so react with surprise to the novelty of the event without explicit knowledge of belief [13], perhaps reflecting the existence of two systems for tracking belief [14]. Nevertheless, the possibility that younger children can reckon on the falsely held representations of other individuals suggests that some other process changes between the ages of 3 and 4 years to enable older children to succeed on the Sally-Anne task [10,15].…”
Section: What Determines Success or Failure? Case Studies From Develomentioning
confidence: 99%