Infant Intentionality and the Attribution of Intentions to Infants

Abstract

The issue is discussed whether or not parental attribution of intentions to infants is a pretense. This issue cannot be investigated if it is meant to be a question whether or not the infant has the specific intentions attributed to it. Problems connected with the usual description of intentionality in terms of goal-directedness are discussed. It is proposed that instead the intentionality of behavior be described in terms of object-directedness, a concept central to the philosophical concept of intentionality. The object-directedness of an infant’s behavior is hypothesized to elicit the parent’s perception of infant intentionality. Parental attribution of infant intentions is proposed to be considered a pretense only in the absence of object-directedness in the behavior of the infant.

Infant intentionality as object directedness: A method for observation*

“…As to the other measure of intentional infant behavior, Degree of Intentionality, reliability measures will be given for the two components of the measure, Intensity of Attention and Behavioral Coherence, as well as for the Degree of Intentionality as such (i.e., the sum of the two component scores). This measure is the most important part of the method developed here, and derives from the theoretical arguments presented by Vedeler (1987Vedeler ( , 1991. As a computational method, the intraclass correlation @' ) will be used, in order to check for observer bias (Suen & Ary, 1989, p. 120, 132).…”

“…The use of the Degree of Intentionality variable has been a deliberate attempt to focus more closely upon the perception of intentionality by concentrating on its constituent components, namely Intensity of Attention and Behavioral Coherence. The KSD-principle (Kinematic Specificaiton of Dynamics), proposed by Runeson (e.g., Runeson & Frykhoim, 1983), has been an important asset in the development of a definition of infant intentionality in terms of object directedness (Vedeler, 1987(Vedeler, , 1991. Vedeler's discussion implies that intentionality can be described as a dynamic relationship between the acting organism and the object of this action, and that this relationship can be directly perceived.…”

“…Instead of relating the intentional action to a future state of affairs to be realized through the action, they relate it to a specific piece of environment, as an already existing goal, as it were. Vedeler (1987Vedeler ( , 1991 proposes that the point can be clarified by relating the concept of intentionality, as used in infant research, to the philosophical concept. In philosophy intentionality is generally considered as a property of mental phenomena, and of consciousness, namely to be about something.…”

“…Based on the views of Goldstein and Merleau-Ponty on the relationship between organism and environment, Vedeler (1987Vedeler ( , 1991 has proposed that infant intentionality be defined in terms of behuuiorul object directedness, rather than in terms of goal directedness. This view makes the fact that behavior normally is perceived as either intentional or not compatible with the idea that the basis for this perception is a quality of the behavior that varies along a continuous scale.…”