Inequality, cooperation, and growth: An experimental study

Sadrieh, Abdolkarim; Verbon, H.A.A.

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.01.009

Cited by 64 publications

(55 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…In contrast, when the rich deliberately choose the low inequality setting, we expect that the poor engage in even more cooperation than in a low inequality setting fixed by nature. Hence, we expect the reciprocal behavior of the poor in the dictator treatment to lead to a clear negative effect of inequality choice on growth, while in the nature treatment we expect to replicate the neutrality finding of Sadrieh and Verbon (2002).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 81%

“…We first check whether the neutrality result found by Sadrieh and Verbon (2002) is replicated, i.e. whether the inclination to cooperate by rich and poor individuals is neutral to the degree of inequality in the nature treatment.…”

Section: Experimental Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Just as in Sadrieh and Verbon (2002), the degree of inequality is varied. The important new feature of this study is that, in one treatment, the degree of inequality is chosen by the rich individual (the dictator) before the interaction starts.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Self-serving dictators and economic growth

Haile

Sadrieh

Verbon

2008

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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A new line of theoretical and empirical literature emphasizes the pivotal role of fair institutions for growth. We present a model, a laboratory experiment, and a simple cross-country regression supporting this view. We model an economy with an unequal distribution of property rights, in which individuals can free-ride or cooperate. Experimentally we observe a dramatic drop in cooperation (and growth), when inequality is increased by a selfserving dictator. No such effect is observed when the inequality is increased by a fair procedure. Our regression analysis provides basic macroeconomic support for the adverse growth effect of the interaction between the degree and the genesis of inequality. We conclude that economies giving equal opportunities to all are not likely to suffer retarded growth due to inequality in the way economies with self-serving dictators will.JEL codes: C91, D60, K40, O40, P51

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 81%

Section: Experimental Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

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Self-serving dictators and economic growth

Haile

Sadrieh

Verbon

2008

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…Ostrom et al (1994), van Dijk et al (2002), and Cherry et al (2005 find that inequality leads to lower contributions, Chan et al (1996) and Buckley and Croson (2006) report a positive effect, and Chan et al (1999) and Sadrieh and Verbon (2006) no effect. With respect to heterogeneity in the marginal benefit from the public good, Fisher et al (1995) find that individuals with a high marginal benefit contribute more than those with a low marginal benefit.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Reuben

Riedl

2013

Games and Economic Behavior

273

211

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations AbstractEconomic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous characteristics. We investigate experimentally the emergence and informal enforcement of different contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous and different heterogeneous groups. When punishment is not allowed all groups converge towards free-riding. With punishment, contributions increase and differ distinctly across groups and individuals with different induced characteristics. We show econometrically that these differences are not accidentally but enforced by punishment. The enforced contribution norms are related to fairness ideas of equity regarding the contributions but not regarding the earnings. Individuals with different characteristics tacitly agree on the norm to be enforced, even if this leads to large payoff differences. Our results also emphasize the role of details of the environment that may alter focal contribution norms in an important way.JEL Code: H41, C92, Z13.

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“…Note that there is a strand of literature on heterogeneous endowments in public good games, including Chan et al (1999), van Dijk et al (2002, Cherry et al (2005), Buckley and Croson (2006), Sadrieh and Verbon (2006). than the immigration requirement).…”

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confidence: 99%

Setting the bar - an experimental investigation of immigration requirements

Khadjavi

Tjaden

2018

Journal of Public Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may Setting the Bar -An Experimental Investigation of Immigration RequirementsMenusch Khadjavi*, Jasper D. Tjaden Abstract: Many Western countries face the challenge of reconciling future labor demand with growing public opposition to immigration. The dynamics and underlying processes of setting immigration requirements remain unclear as research so far mainly focuses on context-specific empirical studies. We use a public good game experiment with endogenous groups to investigate how different levels of perceived migrant potential and public debate shape immigration requirements. We employ the minimal group paradigm and immigration requirements are set by in-group voting. Our results suggest that fairness and efficiency of immigration requirements may best be described by the relationship between average population indicators and required contributions of immigrants. Public debate appears to foster fair and efficient requirements if perceived migrant potential is high.

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Inequality, cooperation, and growth: An experimental study

Cited by 64 publications

References 24 publications

Self-serving dictators and economic growth

Self-serving dictators and economic growth

Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Setting the bar - an experimental investigation of immigration requirements

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