Inequality and Segregation

Abstract

Despite the decline in group inequality and the rapid expansion of the black middle class in the United States, major urban centers with significant black populations continue to exhibit extreme levels of racial separation. Using a theoretical framework in which individuals care both about the level of affluence and the racial composition of their communities, we show that no monotonic relationship exists between narrowing racial income disparities and segregation even when all households prefer somewhat integrated communities to segregated ones. Low racial inequality is consistent with extreme and even rising levels of segregation in cities where the minority population is large. Our results can help explain why racial segregration continues to characterize the urban landscape in the United States even though survey evidence suggests that all groups favor more integration than they did in the past.

The evolution of altruistic punishment

“…However, here we show that group selection can lead to the evolution of altruistic punishment in larger groups because the problem of deterring free riders in the case of altruistic cooperation is fundamentally different from the problem of deterring free riders in the case of altruistic punishment. This asymmetry arises because the payoff disadvantage of altruistic cooperators relative to defectors is independent of the frequency of defectors in the population, whereas the cost disadvantage for those engaged in altruistic punishment declines as defectors become rare because acts of punishment become very infrequent (13). Thus, when altruistic punishers are common, individual level selection operating against them is weak.…”

Choosing peers: Homophily and polarization in groups

“…The size of mutually optimal groups in this case has to be smaller than e n(c). If c is (weakly) below c ; k A max (c) + k B max (c) is above e n(c): This implies that when agents consider adding agents to their group to gain more contributions, the constraints 16 Recall our assumption that d(n) 6 = c for all n: It then follows that d(ñ + 1) > c.…”

“…We show that the structure of mutually optimal groups depends crucially on the relative size of contribution and connection costs with respect to one another. Denote by e n(c) the maximal integer such that d(n) < c. 16 If d(n) < c for all n, we denote e n(c) = 1:…”

“…6 For example, it has been empirically documented how improvements in public goods tend to increase the size of a community (Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008). See also Rhode and Strumpf (2003) and Sethi and Somanathan (2004). changes in the public good o¤erings when contemplating a deviation to a di¤erent community.…”

Are My Neighbours Ageing Yet? Local Dimensions of Demographic Change in German Cities

“…Gans 1962, Coulson 1968, Heinritz and Lichtenberger 1991, Knox 1995, in the more recent literature relatively little attention has been paid to demographic segregation. Analysis of segregation in North American cities has typically been concerned with ethnic groups (Sethi andSomanathan 2004, Johnston et al 2007) or the tenure status (Hoff and Sen 2005). In Europe, the main attention has been paid to socioeconomic disparities (e.g.…”