Inequality and Conservation on the Local Commons: A Theoretical Exercise

Dayton-Johnson, Jeff; Bardhan, Pranab

doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00731

Cited by 126 publications

(65 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…In this way, the location of the resource influences the users to join in a collective effort. The reasons are highly consistent with various opinions expressed in the empirical literature, for example Bardhan (1993); Dayton- Johnson and Bardhan (1999);Agarwal (2002) and Araral (2009). They found that cooperation is more difficult when water is either very scarce (due to potential conflict on water allocation) or is plentiful (because of little incentive to cooperate, since water is abundant).…”

Section: A) Physical and Technical Characteristics Of The Resourcesupporting

confidence: 82%

Social Determinants of Collective Resource Management in Bangladesh

Haque

Hossain

Bauer³

et al. 2013

Progress. Agric.

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This paper examines the factors influencing collective action for common resource management. As information base, data sets of 44 brackish water shrimp farming communities in Bangladesh have been used. The result shows that collective action is associated with resource scarcity, market distance from the resource, group size, heterogeneity in the community, and involvement of other institutions. The results tell that while graduates facilitate, outsiders impede collective action. Unlike the findings from other sources, distance to market place has been found very important for common resource management in Bangladesh. Collective action could be more successful, when water user groups are founded through users self motivation, receiving coordination help and technical support from governmental institutions.

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Section: A) Physical and Technical Characteristics Of The Resourcesupporting

confidence: 82%

Social Determinants of Collective Resource Management in Bangladesh

Haque

Hossain

Bauer³

et al. 2013

Progress. Agric.

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show abstract

“…But when there are very high levels of inequality, there is very low incentive for cooperative action due to either the vested interests of the rich users to deter collective action for personal gain or due to seasonal migration by the poor users, which undermines the sustainability of any cooperative action undertaken by the community (Molinas, 1998) 5 . 5 It should be noted that though the results obtained by Molinas (1998) seem contradictory to those obtained by Bardhan and Dayton Johnson (forthcoming) and Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002) the former study the effect of heterogeneity on cooperation whereas the latter investigates the effect of heterogeneity on…”

Section: Complexities Of Heterogeneitymentioning

confidence: 92%

Heterogeneity and Common Pool Resources: Collective Management of Forests in Himachal Pradesh, India

Naidu

2005

SSRN Journal

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Abstract:In the past two decades, theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that communities of resource users are capable of overcoming social dilemmas, and are capable of creating and sustaining institutions designed to prevent degradation of common pool natural resources. However, there is incomplete understanding of what motivates this group-level behavior and why some communities are better adept at solving collective action problems than others. This paper specifically explores the role of group heterogeneity in collective action among forest communities in the northwestern Himalayas. Heterogeneity can have important social and ecological consequences and understanding both its nature and effects can help in neutralizing the negative and enhancing the positive. Based on data from 54 forest communities in Himachal Pradesh, India, this paper finds that heterogeneity has at least three dimensions: wealth, identity and interest, and each may significantly affect collective actions related to natural resource management. However, their effects are far from simple and linear.Keywords: common pool resources, group outcomes, heterogeneity, forests JEL Classification: D63, D71, H41, Q23, Q57 This paper explores the role of group heterogeneity in collective action among forest communities in northwestern Himalayas. Based on data from 54 forest communities in Himachal Pradesh, India, this paper finds that heterogeneity has at least three dimensions:wealth, social identity and interest in the resource, and each may significantly affect collective actions related to natural resource management. However, their effects are far from simple and linear. The empirical results suggest that cooperation need not depend on caste parochialism, that very high levels of wealth heterogeneity can reduce cooperation, and that there can be a divergence between ability and incentive to cooperate which reduces the level of cooperation in the community.

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“…Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002), for instance, show that the relationship between inequality and levels of collective action in conservation can be U-shaped in the fishery sector. Fishers who have outside earnings opportunities may believe that increased inequality has a negative effect on conservation.…”

Section: Elite Capture In Natural Resource Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Elite Capture in Local Fishery Management Post-Socialist Experiences from Albania

Schmidt¹,

Theesfeld

2012

SSRN Journal

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Local self-governance based on institutions for collective action can help overcome social dilemmas in the management of complex Common Pool Resources, such as fish. A common path towards local self-governance is decentralization, and within this context, a transfer of property rights from central government to local resource users. Yet, despite the well-documented successes of many decentralization policies in support of local common property regimes, the phenomenon of elite capture remains a risk. This paper investigates elite capture in Albania's Lake Ohrid fishing region. Our empirical findings draw onto an in-depth case study on local consequences of 2002's decentralization efforts by the Albanian fishery administration. We show how 'blueprint' approaches, top-down implementation, and weak institutions led to further empowerment of privileged locals. Our findings further indicate how those privileged locals realize significant personal gains at the expense of distributional inequity within the community. Specifically original insights are derived from our analysis of implications from the post-socialist context, which we show to facilitate capture because of a common susceptibility for destructive leadership and a lack of confidence in collective action. We believe that to understand those contextual peculiarities -and to act upon this understandingrepresents a pivotal prerequisite to the functional and equitable governance of common property regimes in any transitional society.

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Inequality and Conservation on the Local Commons: A Theoretical Exercise

Cited by 126 publications

References 20 publications

Social Determinants of Collective Resource Management in Bangladesh

Social Determinants of Collective Resource Management in Bangladesh

Heterogeneity and Common Pool Resources: Collective Management of Forests in Himachal Pradesh, India

Elite Capture in Local Fishery Management Post-Socialist Experiences from Albania

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