Industry self-regulation of food advertisement to children: Compliance versus effectiveness of the EU Pledge

Landwehr, Stefanie C.; Hartmann, Monika

doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2020.101833

Cited by 17 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…The interest of the food industry in the management of pledges for advertising is confirmed [ 77 ] by an increase in the number of TV adverts compared to years ago, as the results of our study show. The government of Spain continues to support self-regulation following the PAOS code [ 40 , 52 ].…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 75%

The Nutritional Profile of Food Advertising for School-Aged Children via Television: A Longitudinal Approach

et al. 2020

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The prevalence of childhood obesity continues to increase. Screen time, one of the most documented reasons for the obesogenic environment, enhances childhood obesity, since advertisements for unhealthy food products are still broadcast on channels for children. This is presently one of the main challenges for the government in Spain, since the current laws and obligations are not updated. This study aims to analyze food advertising aimed at children on Spanish television in 2013 and 2018 on children’s and general channels to test the effect of laws and obligations over time. In total, we viewed 512 h of the most viewed channels, two children’s and two general channels, during the week and on weekends during specific periods of 2013 and 2018. Food advertising was categorized as core, non-core, and other food advertisement (CFA, NCFA, and OFA, respectively) according to the nutritional profile. A total of 2935 adverts were analyzed, 1263 in 2013 and 1672 in 2018. A higher proportion of NCFAs were broadcast on children’s channels than in prior years, rising from 52.2% to 69.8% (p < 0.001). Nowadays, the risk of watching NCFAs on children’s channels compared to general channels turns out to be higher (Odds ratio > 2.5; p < 0.001), due to exposure to adverts for high-sugar and high-fat foods such as cakes, muffins, cookies, and fried and frozen meals rich in fat. In conclusion, the trends of nutritional profiles in food advertising on television are worsening over time, since the prevalence of NCFAs was higher in 2018 than in 2013. Currently, CFAs are not mainly broadcast on children’s channels, confirming high-risk exposure to non-core food advertising by watching them. Thus, food advertising laws and obligations should be adapted to increase compliance.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 75%

The Nutritional Profile of Food Advertising for School-Aged Children via Television: A Longitudinal Approach

et al. 2020

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“… 4–12 Self-regulation of advertising, for instance, does not appear to be effective enough to reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food adverts 6 8 125–128 and industry codes have widely been criticised as weak by public health researchers. 6 129 In line with evidence which suggests that industry-funded research results in more favourable conclusions, 51–55 industry evaluations of self-regulatory codes tend to report much higher effectiveness and compliance than independent evaluations. 128 This may explain our observation that the vast majority of claims in favour of self-regulatory or co-regulatory approaches relied on industry-produced or industry-commissioned materials.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Independent evidence also indicates that self-regulation is not sufficient to address the issues of obesity and dietary NCDs. [4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12] Self-regulation of advertising, for instance, does not appear to be effective enough to reduce children's exposure to unhealthy food adverts 6 8 125-128 and industry codes have widely been criticised as weak by public health researchers. 6 129 In line with evidence which suggests that industry-funded research results in more favourable conclusions, [51][52][53][54][55] industry evaluations of self-regulatory codes tend to report much higher effectiveness and compliance than independent evaluations.…”

Section: Bmj Global Healthmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3 Over recent decades, it has become increasingly evident that industry self-regulation is less effective to improve diets than government regulation. [4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16] Yet, and despite sustained calls by the public health community for comprehensive regulatory frameworks to safeguard children's right to health in particular, [17][18][19][20] such policies remain sporadic. This disconnect reflects the significant role played by politics, values, ideas and discourse, as well as the notion that all evidence is socially constructed, 21 contestable…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Commercial use of evidence in public health policy: a critical assessment of food industry submissions to global-level consultations on non-communicable disease prevention

2021

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BackgroundUltra-processed food industry (UPFI) actors have consistently opposed statutory regulation in health policy debates, including at the WHO. They do so most commonly with claims that regulatory policies do not work, will have negative consequences or that alternatives such as self-regulation work well or better. Underlying this are often assertions that industry is aligned with principles of evidence-based policymaking. In this study, we interrogate if this holds true by exploring the extent and quality of the evidence UPFI respondents employed to support claims around regulatory policy, and how they did this.MethodsFirst, we identified all submissions from organisations who overtly represent UPFI companies to consultations held by the WHO on non-communicable disease policy between 2016 and 2018. Second, we extracted all relevant factual claims made in these submissions and noted if any evidence was referenced in support. Third, we assessed the quality of evidence using independence from UPFI, nature, and publication route as indicators. Lastly, where peer-reviewed research was cited, we examined if the claims made could be justified by the source cited.ResultsAcross 26 included consultation responses, factual claims around regulation were made in 18, although only 10 referenced any evidence at all. Of all 114 claims made, 39 pieces of identifiable evidence were cited in support of 56 claims. Of the 39 distinct pieces of evidence, two-thirds were industry-funded or industry-linked, with only 16 externally peer-reviewed. Over half of industry-funded or industry-linked academic articles failed to declare a conflict of interest (COI). Overall, of only six claims which drew on peer-reviewed and independent research, none appropriately represented the source.DiscussionUPFI respondents made far-reaching claims which were rarely supported by high-quality, independent evidence. This indicates that there may be few, if any, benefits from consulting actors with such a clear COI.

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“…Food and beverage companies have also produced their own marketing codes, ranging from individual company pledges, such as those made by PepsiCo [ 43 ], to broader voluntary agreements between companies, for instance, the International Food and Beverage Alliance’s Global Policy on Marketing Communications to Children [ 44 ] and the EU Pledge , a self-regulatory initiative by food and beverage companies and the World Federation of Advertisers [ 45 – 47 ]. Overall, independent assessments of voluntary initiatives suggest that they are unlikely to be effective enough in reducing children’s exposure to unhealthy marketing [ 15 , 46 , 48 – 54 ], whereas industry evaluations tend to report high compliance levels and positive impacts on children’s environments [ 15 , 34 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate political activity in the context of unhealthy food advertising restrictions across Transport for London: A qualitative case study

Lauber

Hunt²,

Gilmore

et al. 2021

PLoS Med

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Background Diets with high proportions of foods high in fat, sugar, and/or salt (HFSS) contribute to malnutrition and rising rates of childhood obesity, with effects throughout the life course. Given compelling evidence on the detrimental impact HFSS advertising has on children’s diets, the World Health Organization unequivocally supports the adoption of restrictions on HFSS marketing and advertising. In February 2019, the Greater London Authority introduced novel restrictions on HFSS advertising across Transport for London (TfL), one of the most valuable out-of-home advertising estates. In this study, we examined whether and how commercial actors attempted to influence the development of these advertising restrictions. Methods and findings Using requests under the Freedom of Information Act, we obtained industry responses to the London Food Strategy consultation, correspondence between officials and key industry actors, and information on meetings. We used an existing model of corporate political activity, the Policy Dystopia Model, to systematically analyse arguments and activities used to counter the policy. The majority of food and advertising industry consultation respondents opposed the proposed advertising restrictions, many promoting voluntary approaches instead. Industry actors who supported the policy were predominantly smaller businesses. To oppose the policy, industry respondents deployed a range of strategies. They exaggerated potential costs and underplayed potential benefits of the policy, for instance, warning of negative economic consequences and questioning the evidence underlying the proposal. Despite challenging the evidence for the policy, they offered little evidence in support of their own claims. Commercial actors had significant access to the policy process and officials through the consultation and numerous meetings, yet attempted to increase access, for example, in applying to join the London Child Obesity Taskforce and inviting its members to events. They also employed coalition management, engaging directly and through business associations to amplify their arguments. Some advertising industry actors also raised the potential of legal challenges. The key limitation of this study is that our data focused on industry–policymaker interactions; thus, our findings are unable to present a comprehensive picture of political activity. Conclusions In this study, we identified substantial opposition from food and advertising industry actors to the TfL advertising restrictions. We mapped arguments and activities used to oppose the policy, which might help other public authorities anticipate industry efforts to prevent similar restrictions in HFSS advertising. Given the potential consequences of commercial influence in these kinds of policy spaces, public bodies should consider how they engage with industry actors.

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Industry self-regulation of food advertisement to children: Compliance versus effectiveness of the EU Pledge

Cited by 17 publications

References 42 publications

The Nutritional Profile of Food Advertising for School-Aged Children via Television: A Longitudinal Approach

The Nutritional Profile of Food Advertising for School-Aged Children via Television: A Longitudinal Approach

Commercial use of evidence in public health policy: a critical assessment of food industry submissions to global-level consultations on non-communicable disease prevention

Corporate political activity in the context of unhealthy food advertising restrictions across Transport for London: A qualitative case study

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