Industrial Policy and Economic Transformation

Coutinho, Luciano Galvão; Ferraz, João Carlos; Nassif, André; Oliva, Rafael

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199747504.013.0004

Cited by 8 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…2 Pack and Saggi (2006: 267-8) define industrial policy as, "any type of selective government intervention or policy that attempts to alter the structure of production in favor of sectors that are expected to offer better prospects for economic growth in a way that would not occur in the absence of such intervention in the market equilibrium." 3 Among other recent studies, see Sabel (2009: 5); Kuznetsov and Dahlman (2008: 112); Devlin and Moguillansky (2011);Coutinho et al (2012); Machinea (2008). In his analysis of new export activity and self-discovery in Latin America, Sabel (2012) argues that the key to success is coordination both among private producers and between public and private actors.…”

Section: On This -----------------------------------mentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Hausmann, Rodrik, and Sabel (2008), for example, propose outside evaluating teams, including academics and MNC executives. Others emphasize the importance of publishing relevant data and encouraging active and independent media coverage (Coutinho et al, 2012). However, the record of supposedly independent monitoring bodies in Latin America is spotty, as they can be easy to manipulate, politicize, or ignore.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The câmaras were designed to be tripartite (government, business, and labor) and negotiate short-term agreements on wages, prices and, in some cases, taxes and other sectoral priorities. The câmara with the largest impact was in the auto industry where representatives from labor unions, government ministries, and associations of auto assemblers, auto parts producers, and auto dealers met to negotiate agreements over prices, wages, employment, and taxes (Arbix, 1995;Toledo, 1994;Coutinho et al, 2012;Doctor, 2007a).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Institutions for Effective Business-Government Collaboration: Micro Mechanisms and Macro Politics in Latin America

Schneider

2013

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. Terms of use: Documents inThe unauthorized commercial use of Bank documents is prohibited and may be punishable under the Bank's policies and/or applicable laws. Copyright ©Inter-American Development Bank. This working paper may be reproduced for any non-commercial purpose. It may also be reproduced in any academic journal indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, with previous consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Cataloging-in-Publication AbstractWhat makes for effective cooperation between government and business in industrial policy? Core research questions on the institutional design of arrangements for business-government interactions focus on three main functions: i) maximizing the benefits of dialogue and information exchange; ii) motivating participation through authoritative allocation; and iii) minimizing unproductive rent seeking. Countries with more experiences of public-private collaboration (PPC) tend to have more pragmatic governments and better organized and informally networked private sectors. Effective cooperation also depends on the macro context, in particular the nature of the political system and the alternative avenues it provides for business politicking, especially through parties, networks and appointments, the media, and campaign finance. Lastly, the structure and strategies of big domestic businesses-mostly diversified, family-owned business groups-affects their preferences and interest in collaborating in industrial policy. JEL classifications: D72, L52

show abstract

Section: On This -----------------------------------mentioning

confidence: 98%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Institutions for Effective Business-Government Collaboration: Micro Mechanisms and Macro Politics in Latin America

Schneider

2013

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…After almost two decades of neglecting industrial policy, the first term of President Lula Inácio da Silva (2003Silva ( -2006 represented a turning point. More specifically, the launch of the Industrial, Technology, and Foreign Policy (PITCE -Política Industrial, Tecnológicae de Comé-rcio Exterior) document in 2004, followed by the creation of the National Council of Industrial Development (CNDI -Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Industrial) and the Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development (ABDI -Agência Brasileira de Desenvolvimento Industrial), have been hailed as landmarks of the rebirth of industrial policy (Coutinho, et al, 2012;Kupfer, Ferraz & Marques, 2013).…”

Section: Path Dependency In Brazilian Industrial Policy-makingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Catching up and Falling behind: An Appraisal of Brazilian Industrial Policy in the Twenty-First Century

Kasahara

Botelho

2016

ERLACS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Amidst analyses of industrial policy's renaissance in Latin America, Brazil is often hailed as the paragon of this movement. The mix of old and new institutions and instruments would constitute a unique effort in promoting industrial development in the post-neoliberal period. However, this experience has been followed by middling results of industrial performance. Reviewing an emerging literature about the institutionalization and results of the Brazilian industrial policy, we argue that important aspects of path-dependency have been ignored. Organizational and ideational resistance have led to a much more traditional and conservative industrial policy than would be expected. Grounded historical analysis about intragovernment conflicts, combined with studies about policy and sectoral developments, could give us elements to better assess the failures and achievements of the Brazilian case. Keywords: industrial policy, Brazil, path dependency, innovation, institutions.Resumen: Avances y retrocesos: Una evaluación de la política industrial brasileña en el siglo XXI A la luz de diversos análisis sobre el renacimiento de la política industrial en América Latina, Brasil es frecuentemente alabado como el país arquetipo de la mencionada coyuntura. La combinación de instituciones e instrumentos antiguos y modernos constituiría un singular esfuerzo para promover el desarrollo industrial en el periodo post-neoliberal. Sin embargo, la consecución de dicha experiencia fueron mediocres resultados de actividad industrial. Habiendo efectuado un examen de reciente literatura sobre la institucionalización y los resultados de la política industrial brasileña, sostenemos que, en dicho material, han sido ignorados importantes aspectos de la dependencia de la trayectoria (path-dependency). Resistencia organizativa y de formación de ideas han conducido a la implementación de una política industrial mucho más tradicional y conservadora de lo que se hubiera esperado. Un profundo

show abstract

“…12 In order to put the PAC in action, the target for primary fiscal surplus could be reduced from 4.25 per cent of the GDP to 3.75 per cent of the GDP if necessary. 13 For details on PDP, see Coutinho et al . (2012). early to evaluate the performance of such an ambitious industrial programme, not only because of its complexity, but also in virtue of the negative effects of the post-2008 global economic crisis on the Brazilian economy, whose main consequence was to either reduce or paralyze most private investments in Brazil.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Liberal versus neo-developmental convention to growth: why has Brazil shown a poor performance since the 1980s?

André

Feijó

2013

Rev. Econ. Polit.

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Liberal versus neo-developmental convention to growth: Why has Brazil shown a poor performance since the 1980s? André nAssif CArmem feijó*The main goal of our paper is to provide analytical arguments to explain why Brazil has not been able to restore its long-term capacity for economic growth, especially compared with its economy in the 1950-1979 period (7.3 per cent per year on average) or even with a select number of emerging economies in the 1980-2010 period (6.7 per cent per year on average, against 2.3 per cent per year on average in Brazil in the same period). We build our idea of convention to growth based on the Keynesian concept of convention. For our purposes, this concept could be briefly summarized as the way in which the set of public and private economic decisions related to different objectives, such as how much to produce and invest, how much to charge for products and services, how to finance public and private debt, how to finance research and development, and so on, are indefinitely -or at least until there is no change -carried out by the political, economic and social institutions. This analytical reference can be connected to the Neo-Schumpeterian National Innovation System (NIS) concept, which emphasizes not only institutions associated with science and technology per se, but also the complex interaction among them and other institutions. In this paper we identify two conventions to long-term growth in the last three decades in Brazil: the liberal and the neo-developmental. We show that the poor performance in the Brazilian economy in terms of real GDP growth from the 1980s on can be explained by a weak coordination between short-term macroeconomic policies and long-term industrial and technological policies. This weak coordination, in turn, can be associated with the prevalence of the liberal convention from the 1990s on, which has emphasized price stabilization to the detriment of a neo-developmental strategy whose primary goal is to sustain higher rates of growth and full employment in Brazil.

show abstract

Industrial Policy and Economic Transformation

Cited by 8 publications

References 0 publications

Institutions for Effective Business-Government Collaboration: Micro Mechanisms and Macro Politics in Latin America

Institutions for Effective Business-Government Collaboration: Micro Mechanisms and Macro Politics in Latin America

Catching up and Falling behind: An Appraisal of Brazilian Industrial Policy in the Twenty-First Century

Liberal versus neo-developmental convention to growth: why has Brazil shown a poor performance since the 1980s?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About