Industrial Accidents in Bangladesh Apparel Manufacturing Sector: An Analysis of the Two Most Deadliest Accidents in History

Abstract

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Methodological Challenges in the Economic Evaluation of Occupational Health and Safety Programmes

“…Second, investments in OHS can have an effect upon costs associated with a bad reputation. ‘Sweat shops’ [ 48 ], unequal treatment of migrant workers [ 48 ], textile factory accidents [ 49 ], or excessive overwork [ 50 ] can catch public attention and affect a firm’s image, and thus possibly hit customer brand loyalty or sales. A survey among large UK companies (the yearly Captains of Industry Survey) also indicated this as a concern among managers: 79% of the senior directors saw health and safety as having a tangible impact upon corporate reputation [ 51 ], while later versions of the survey (e.g., in 2012) noted reputation or company brand as a key factor to stand out as a company [ 52 ].…”

Is Ohs Negligence and Evasion an “Error of Judgement” or “White-Collar Crime”? An Interpretation of Apparel Manufacturers in Bangladesh

“…However, this does not appear to be the case. The explicit reason for the confounding number of workplace deaths in the RMG sector is the reluctance observed among many factory owners with regard to conformity to the OHS provisions (Chowdhury & Tanim, 2016;Zaman et al, 2013). The evidence shows that these high-status people in society are uninterested in making calculative decisions to implement OHS as an incentive to safeguard their factories against undesirable catastrophes.…”

“…willingness to act rationally is somewhat compromised in a situation where there is ample empirical evidence of a lack of worthwhile safety audits, and nor has any kind of justifiable investigation been observed whatsoever by the government of the country or social compliance authorities (Ahmed et al, 2014;Chowdhury & Tanim, 2016;Yunus & Yamagata 2012;Zaman et al, 2013). On several occasions, people in the factory make decisions intentionally to become involved in a deviant act by taking advantage of the situation whereby their factories are excluded from the foreign retailers' audit process or because of the government's incapability to monitor and impose sanctions on them (Ahmed et al, 2014;Chowdhury & Tanim, 2016;Zaman et al, 2013).…”

“…On several occasions, people in the factory make decisions intentionally to become involved in a deviant act by taking advantage of the situation whereby their factories are excluded from the foreign retailers' audit process or because of the government's incapability to monitor and impose sanctions on them (Ahmed et al, 2014;Chowdhury & Tanim, 2016;Zaman et al, 2013). This shows that this evasive nature is not an "error of judgement," but a rational choice whereby an individual acts to balance the costs against the benefits to arrive at action that maximises his/her own personal advantage.…”

“…Tombs & Whyte (2013) and Bodman & Maultby (1997) highlighted this as a rational calculation that weighs the chances of being caught and the severity of the punitive measures against the benefits of committing a crime. Chowdhury & Tanim's (2016) study showed that RMG factory owners and managers make intentional decisions about nonconforming with the OHS provisions where the benefit of evading these OHS provisions is considered to be more profitable than complying with them. This means that rational choice depends upon the factory personnel's knowledge of the "benefit of not being caught," rather than the "risks of being caught."…”