Inductive Proofs of Computational Secrecy

Roy, Arnab; Datta, Anupam; Derek, Ante; Mitchell, John C.

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-74835-9_15

Cited by 15 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…In addition, the present soundness proofs are based on a new cryptographic definition and associated theorems about the joint security of multiple encryption schemes keyed using random or DHKE-keys. This paper complements [39] and completes the development of formal cryptographically sound proofs for three modes of Kerberos V5 ( [42] contains technical details).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 62%

“…Section 3.2 summarizes the concept of secretive protocol and proof rules taken from [39] that are used in this paper to establish secrecy properties. However, we give new soundness proofs for these axioms, based on an extension of standard multiparty encryption schemes [10] to allow for multiple public and symmetric encryption schemes keyed using random or Diffie-Hellman based keys.…”

Section: Proof Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The axioms presented in this paper are used in Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) [24,26,41,25,39]. Our formalization uses the characterization of "good key" from [27], but improves on previous work in several respects: (i) we fix a bug in the DH axiom in [27] by using the "DHStrongSecretive" formulas developed in the paper, (ii) we present a general inductive method for proving secrecy conditions for Diffie-Hellman key exchange, and (iii) we present axioms for reasoning from ciphertext integrity assumptions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Additional background appears in [24,26,41,25,39]. Modelling protocols A protocol is given by a set of roles, each specifying a sequence of actions to be executed by an honest agent.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Protocol logic, proof system, cryptographic soundness The syntax of PCL and the informal descriptions of the principal predicates are given in [25,39]. Most protocol proofs use formulas of the form θ[P ] X φ, which are similar to Hoare triples.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Formal Proofs of Cryptographic Security of Diffie-Hellman-Based Protocols

Datta

Mitchell

Trustworthy Global Computing

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Abstract. We present axioms and inference rules for reasoning about Diffie-Hellman-based key exchange protocols and use these rules to prove authentication and secrecy properties of two important protocol standards, the Diffie-Hellman variant of Kerberos, and IKEv2, the revised standard key management protocol for IPSEC. The new proof system is sound for an accepted semantics used in cryptographic studies. In the process of applying our system, we uncover a deficiency in Diffie-Hellman Kerberos that is easily repaired.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 62%

Section: Proof Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Additional background appears in [24,26,41,25,39]. Modelling protocols A protocol is given by a set of roles, each specifying a sequence of actions to be executed by an honest agent.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Formal Proofs of Cryptographic Security of Diffie-Hellman-Based Protocols

Datta

Mitchell

Trustworthy Global Computing

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Cryptographically Sound Security Proofs for Basic and Public-Key Kerberos

Backes

Cervesato

Jaggard

et al. 2006

Computer Security – ESORICS 2006

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We present a computational analysis of basic Kerberos with and without its public-key extension PKINIT in which we consider authentication and key secrecy properties. Our proofs rely on the Dolev-Yaostyle model of Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner, which allows for mapping results obtained symbolically within this model to cryptographically sound proofs if certain assumptions are met. This work was the first verification at the computational level of such a complex fragment of an industrial protocol. By considering a recently fixed version of PKINIT, we extend symbolic correctness results we previously attained in the DolevYao model to cryptographically sound results in the computational model.

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Analysis of EAP-GPSK Authentication Protocol

Mitchell

Rowe

Scedrov

2008

Applied Cryptography and Network Security

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Abstract. The EAP-GPSK protocol is a lightweight, flexible authentication protocol relying on symmetric key cryptography. It is part of an ongoing IETF process to develop authentication methods for the EAP framework. We analyze the protocol and find three weaknesses: a repairable Denial-of-Service attack, an anomaly with the key derivation function used to create a short-term master session key, and a ciphersuite downgrading attack. We propose fixes to these anomalies, and use a finite-state verification tool to search for remaining problems after making these repairs. We then prove the fixed version correct using a protocol verification logic. We discussed the attacks and our suggested fixes with the authors of the specification document which has subsequently been modified to include our proposed changes.

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Inductive Proofs of Computational Secrecy

Cited by 15 publications

References 30 publications

Formal Proofs of Cryptographic Security of Diffie-Hellman-Based Protocols

Formal Proofs of Cryptographic Security of Diffie-Hellman-Based Protocols

Cryptographically Sound Security Proofs for Basic and Public-Key Kerberos

Analysis of EAP-GPSK Authentication Protocol

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