Induction of false beliefs and false memories in laboratory studies—A systematic review

Abstract

Psychological interventions often use guided discovery and other techniques for diagnostic exploration and intervention planning. This way, memories may arise in the person, which may be true or false. False memories of earlier events can be harmful and result in real suffering, similar to actual traumatic memories. Based on cognitive psychological and psycho‐traumatological findings, there is pronounced dissent in the academic disciplines regarding the conceptualization, relevance and research of false memories. This review contributes to the basic question of how often false beliefs and false memories may be induced within the frame of different interactional techniques. A systematic review has been conducted of 59 articles from (quasi‐)experimental studies and two qualitative sources from 30 data bases. Three main methods of memory induction provide the basis for reporting: imagination inflation, false feedback, and memory implantation. Due to the conceptual and methodological diversity of the studies, the results appear to be heterogeneous. Free and guided imagery, as well as suggestive statements, could induce false beliefs or false memories in, on average, 20%–50% of the participants who underwent experimental manipulation concerning false past events. A false belief induction may occur after dream interpretation or hypnosis in more than 50% of participants. Personalized suggestion is more effective in inducing memory than the general plausibility of the suggested events. Further research questions are which therapeutic actions seem appropriate in cases of harmful false memories. This depends not only on whether there are veridical elements in the false memory but also on the quality and meaning of the memory for the person's life and ability to cope with burdens.

Conceptualization of Stress-Related Disorders and PTSD by Cognitive Behavior Therapists

“…Another important finding is that both the w/oT and PTSD groups reported a high rate of personality disorders, anxiety disorders, or depression, as well as symptomatic anxiety or affect disorders. With regard to the life stresses complained about, this raises the question of arbitrary retrospective causal explanations, wishful explanations, or false memories [Deese, 1959;Beck et al, 1987;Christensen-Szalanski and Willham, 1991;Resnick, 1994;Roediger and McDermott, 1995;Loftus, 1997;Stoffels and Ernst, 2002;Pross, 2005;Stiensmeier-Pelster and Heckhausen, 2018;Muschalla and Schönborn, 2021]. Even with accurate memories, the question of coincidences or occasional causes remains [Aumann, 2019].…”

“…The interpretation of past, present, and future also depends on one's own mental state, which is described in detail under headings such as the "cognitive triad" [Beck et al, 1987] or "state-dependent memory and reasoning" or "hindsight bias" [Christensen-Szalanski and Willham, 1991;Roediger and Mc-Dermott, 1995;Stoffels and Ernst, 2002]. Furthermore, false memories of trauma can occur through reading, discussions with third parties, or in therapy [Deese, 1959;Loftus, 1997;Pross, 2005;Muschalla and Schönborn, 2021]. Trauma concepts and explanations also have a certain attractiveness for those affected, as they allow externalizing interpretations of the patient's disorder, with the assumption of a victim role and external assignment of blame.…”

Differences Between True and False Autobiographical Memories

“…The database search included studies published or retrieved before March 14, 2023, but we additionally included an article only published in April 2023 (Murphy et al, 2023), which we were thankfully made aware of. For the full-text screening, we also included n = 23 articles that were mentioned in other reviews with similar topics (Bernstein et al, 2015; Brewin & Andrews, 2017; Muschalla & Schönborn, 2021; Scoboria et al, 2017) that did not come up within our systematic search.…”

Cults, Conspiracies, and Fantasies of Knowledge

“…However, it's empirically well-documented that subjects can mistake even quite fantastical imagined contents for actuality. This occurs especially when subjects mistake imaginings for memories (Loftus 1997;Muschalla and Schönborn 2021). In the phenomenon of "imagination inflation," subjects who are asked by researchers to imagine a fictional past event are prone to later mistake their imaginings for memories.…”