Individuation, Process, and Scientific Practices

Abstract

The questions “What is an individual?” and “What things count as individuals?” are classic philosophical inquiries, currently pursued mainly within analytic metaphysics. This volume takes a new approach, reformulating these questions and exploring them from the perspective of scientific practices. The guiding query then becomes: “How do scientists individuate the things they investigate and thus count them as individuals?” In this first chapter, the volume’s editors lay the groundwork for this new approach. The following sections define the problem of individuation, examine the close relation between individuality and individuation, and motivate the approach taken by this volume in the context of relevant literature. Key themes of the subsequent chapters—experimental practice, process, and pluralism—are discussed, as well as a brief introduction to each chapter.

Pregnant Females as Historical Individuals: An Insight From the Philosophy of Evo-Devo

“…Our brief survey of the main current notions of biological individuality and the stance(s) of each in the case of pregnancy, confirms the current pluralist consensus on the topic (Pradeu, 2016a). Most participants in the debate agree that different notions of biological individuality depend on the questions asked or the perspective favored for solving a particular problem, and are largely relative to the methods and practices used to individuate empirical processes of concern in each disciplinary context (Bueno et al, 2018;Griesemer, 2018;Love, 2018). We have shown how different approaches to individuality, as inspired in the epistemic goals of different biological disciplines, use non-overlapping criteria of individuation that lead to different delineations and conceptualizations of pregnancy.…”

Authentication, scale-relativity, and relational kindhood

“…Ladyman (2007Ladyman ( , 2015 defends a form of weak discernibility compatible with a relational approach to quantum particles, an approach that is congenial to the present account.19 Thanks to Richard Dawid for discussion on this point.20 For an overview of this discussion seeFrench (2019); for further discussions seeLadyman and Ross (2007, ch.3),Muller and Saunders (2008) andCaulton (2013).21 The present account is nonetheless compatible with forms of 'practical individuation' and 'epistemic individuation', for details seeBueno et al (2018).…”

Individual differences, uniqueness, and individuality in behavioural ecology

“…Recently, many philosophers have come to accept pluralism about biological individuality (Bueno et al, 2018;Dupr e, 2012;Ereshefsky & Pedroso, 2015;Love & Brigandt, 2017;McConwell, 2017;Waters, 2018;S ¸encan, 2019). Not only are there multiple criteria vying for attention, it seems that different criteria are relevant in different scientific contexts and for different purposes (Godfrey-Smith, 2013;Wilson & Barker, 2019).…”