Individual transferable quotas as a fisheries management tool

Squires, Dale; Kirkley, James E.; Tisdell, Clement A.

doi:10.1080/10641269509388570

Cited by 113 publications

(63 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…But the share rate can change if there are significant changes in the fishing conditions: (i) important new investments (e.g., electronic equipment, introduction of steam-driven fishing vessels in the Basque Country in Spain led to decrease the crew share to 30% -Pascual Fernandez 1999), (ii) significant variations in fuel prices (Matthiasson 1997), (iii) changes in management (i.e., introduction of ITQs (Squires et al 1995;Guyader and Thebaud 2001)). Thus, the share remuneration systems have proven to be a self-adaptive and timeconsistent remuneration system that can adapt to changing circumstances (Hämäläinen et al 1990;McConnell and Price 2006).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Remuneration systems used in the fishing sector and their consequences on crew wages and labor rent creation

et al. 2017

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In most fisheries worldwide, crew are paid through different shared remuneration systems rather than a fixed wage. In shared remuneration systems, wages can significantly increase when the economic performance of vessels improve, and consequently provide incentives to workers. However, in recent years, mainly due to high overexploitation levels that lead to reduced productivity and consequently lower salaries shared remuneration systems have lost their attractiveness. Different remuneration systems applied in fisheries world-wide are described and analyzed comparatively. Results explain how crew wages and rent distribution outcomes vary between the different remuneration systems depending on the state of exploitation of the resource.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Remuneration systems used in the fishing sector and their consequences on crew wages and labor rent creation

et al. 2017

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“…Among the first effort to preserve fisheries was the introduction of licences (Squires 1995). Rather than having open access to fisheries, fishers now had to have licenses which granted them the right to fish.…”

Section: Fisheries Regulation Through Input Controlsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Duty of stewardship and fisheries governance: a proposed framework

Soliman¹

2014

Maritime Studies

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Fisheries often fall prey to overfishing and the exhaustion of stock. Fishing governance is an ongoing attempt to prevent such an outcome. Over time, fisheries regulation has generally moved from controls on inputs to controls on output, such as catch limits and Individual Transferable Quotas. Individual Transferable Quotas have reduced overcapitalization, and have in some cases allowed stocks to rebuild. However, because they enable market trading of catch shares which tends to concentrate fisheries in fewer hands. This paper proposes applying a duty of stewardship to the existing fisheries governance structure. "Stewardship" is an obligation to be responsible for taking care of another person's property. The concept of stewardship easily applies to fisheries, because fisheries are natural resources which belong to the public. Current regimes, such as Individual Transferable Quotas ("ITQs") do not do enough to prevent the employment of destructive fishing practices and place the burden of natural resource management on the government. Assigning a duty of stewardship upon fishers, whether they own or lease an ITQ, would require fishers to be stewards of common resources and use responsible fishing practices.

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“…ITQs arise in the context of long histories of conflict over privatizing marine rights and more recent histories of social and legal commitment to freedoms of fishing and navigation (Scheiber and Carr, 1997). Their appearance in fisheries management in the 1980s and 1990s is a product of the historical process of widening and deepening the role of markets in economies, and increased recognition of the importance of economic factors in protecting environments and managing natural resources, including the development of market-based tools for management (Squires, Kirkley, and Tisdell, 1995). ITQbased fisheries management is analogous to emissions trading in environmental protection "capand-trade" systems.…”

Section: Itqs In Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

ITQs and Community: An Essay on Environmental Governance

McCay

2004

Agric. resour. econ. rev.

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Two important new directions in resource and environmental management are increased reliance on market mechanisms on the one hand, and on greater participation by local communities on the other. In fisheries, market-based management is found mainly in the "cap-and-trade" systems known as individual transferable quotas (ITQs). ITQs are effective in achieving certain economic goals but often with undesirable social costs, leading to the view that they are antithetical to community-based management. However, ITQ systems have been adapted to mitigate community losses. In addition, social resistance to ITQs has encouraged the development of innovative programs in communitybased fisheries management.

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Individual transferable quotas as a fisheries management tool

Cited by 113 publications

References 54 publications

Remuneration systems used in the fishing sector and their consequences on crew wages and labor rent creation

Remuneration systems used in the fishing sector and their consequences on crew wages and labor rent creation

Duty of stewardship and fisheries governance: a proposed framework

ITQs and Community: An Essay on Environmental Governance

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