Individual training and employees’ cooperative behavior: Evidence from a contextualized laboratory experiment

Abstract

Employers are constantly seeking to improve employee performance by means of investing in employee training. The results of training are to a large extent dependent on employees' willingness to behave productively in a cooperative manner. Yet, systematic evidence investigating the causal relation between training and employees' cooperative behavior is rare. Here, we present results from a contextualized laboratory experiment in which subjects, who differ in terms of training participation, were asked to contribute resources to a team effort. We conclude that training promotes cooperative behavior, that is, voluntary contributions made to the team effort, in teams of employees working together for short periods of time. Training enhances cooperative behavior the most when provided to the higher skilled subjects. We also find that members in more stable teams act very cooperatively under all conditions, but their contributions do not increase further with training.

Introspection dynamics: a simple model of counterfactual learning in asymmetric games

“…Such inequalities naturally arise when individuals take different roles in an interaction (as in the ultimatum game [39,40]), or when they differ in their available strategies [41,42]. But even if individuals have access to the same set of strategies, they may differ in other relevant aspects, such as their initial endowments [43,44], costs [45], productivities [46], or their location in a social network or hierarchy [47][48][49]. In the presence of such heterogeneities, strategies that yield a high payoff for one player may no longer be optimal for another.…”

Cooperation and coordination in heterogeneous populations

“…Furthermore, the relative contributions of the rich are often lower than those of the poor, but their absolute contributions tend to be higher [33][34][35]. Compared with asymmetric endowments, asymmetric productivities have a neutral or positive impact on contributions, and highly productive players often contribute more than players with a low productivity [36][37][38]. By contrast, the effect of asymmetric sharing of public goods seems to be neutral, and players often contribute in proportion to their share [26,[39][40][41][42].…”

Cooperation in changing groups

“…As such, they form a middle ground between pure public goods games and real-life public goods. For example, the public goods game may be contextualized as a group of employees working together in a team (Chen et al, 2009;Van Gerwen et al, 2018) or a group of people stranded on an island that need to build a raft to leave the island (Baptista et al, 2013). Such scenarios may help participants to engage with the problem of public good provision and pay more attention to it, thereby increasing ecological validity.…”

“…Een andere aanpak is het inbrengen van een rijkere context in het publiekgoedspel. Het publiekgoedspel kan bijvoorbeeld gecontextualiseerd worden als een groep werknemers die samen moet werken in een team (Chen et al, 2009;Van Gerwen et al, 2018) of een groep mensen die gestrand zijn op een eiland en samen een vlot moeten bouwen om het eiland te verlaten (Baptista et al, 2013). Dergelijke scenario's kunnen deelnemers helpen om zich in te leven in het spel en er meer aandacht aan te besteden, waardoor de ecologische validiteit toeneemt.…”

“…Group cooperation often requires individual members to make costly contributions that benefit the group as a whole. For example, countries provide public and social security based on citizens' tax payments, neighborhoods maintain clean and safe parks if residents abstain from littering and keep watch, and work organizations survive and grow as a result of collaboration between workers (Dur & Sol, 2010;Sanders, 2009;Van Gerwen et al, 2018;Wageman, 1995). The composition of such groups changes frequently due to the arrival of new members and departure of old members.…”