Individual Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting

Brill, Markus; Israel, Jonas; Micha, Evi; Peters, Jannik

doi:10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20418

Cited by 8 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…When it comes to approval ballots, there is no obvious way to define a measure of the satisfaction of a voter. Brill, Forster, Lackner, Maly and Peters (2023) introduced the concept of approval-based satisfaction functions, which are functions translating a budget allocation into a satisfaction level for the agents, given their approval ballots. Let us provide their definition.…”

Section: Approval Ballotsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, some author's have proposed to model the satisfaction of voters in a way that also takes additional information into account, for example the non-approved projects in the winning bundle. is cannot be modelled with a satisfaction function as defined by Brill, Forster, Lackner, Maly and Peters (2023). See the discussion below for more details.…”

Section: Approval Ballotsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…◮ Square Root and Log Satisfaction Functions (Brill, Forster, Lackner, Maly and Peters, 2023): measures the satisfaction of the voters as (marginally) diminishing when the cost of a project increases:…”

Section: Approval Ballotsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The (Computational) Social Choice Take on Indivisible Participatory Budgeting

Rey¹,

Malý²

2023

Preprint

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In this survey, we review the literature investigating participatory budgeting as a social choice problem. Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a democratic tool aiming at making budgeting decisions in a more democratic manner. Specifically, citizens are asked to vote on who to allocate a given amount of money to a set of projects that can potentially be funded. From a social choice perspective, it corresponds then to the problem of aggregating opinions about which projects should be funded, into a budget allocation satisfying a budget constraint. is problem has received substantial a ention in recent years and the literature is growing at a fast pace. In this survey, we present the most important research directions from the literature, each time presenting a large set of representative results. We only focus on the indivisible case, that is, PB problems in which projects can either be fully funded or not at all. e aim of the survey is to present a comprehensive overview of the state of the research on PB. We aim at providing both a general overview of the main research questions that are being investigated, and formal and unified definitions of the most important technical concepts from the literature.Of course a survey is never complete as the state of the research keeps changing. is document is intended to be a living document that gets updated every now and then as the literature grows. If you feel that some papers are not presented correctly, or simply missing, feel free to contact us. We will be more than happy to correct it.⋆ Laruelle (2021) considers that the agents submit weak and complete rankings over the projects, that are then converted into cardinal scores (via positional scoring functions) for the aggregation.

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Section: Approval Ballotsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Approval Ballotsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The (Computational) Social Choice Take on Indivisible Participatory Budgeting

Rey¹,

Malý²

2023

Preprint

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“…The abcvoting package has been used in a number of publications (Brill et al, 2022;Fairstein et al, 2022;Godziszewski et al, 2021;Lackner & Skowron, 2020;Szufa et al, 2022). In addition, it contains Python code for many of the examples appearing in the book Multi-winner voting with approval preferences (Lackner & Skowron, 2023).…”

Section: Statement Of Needmentioning

confidence: 99%

abcvoting: A Python package for approval-based multi-winner voting rules

Lackner¹,

Regner²,

Krenn³

2023

JOSS

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The Python package abcvoting is a research tool to explore and analyse approval-based committee (ABC) elections (Faliszewski et al., 2017;Lackner & Skowron, 2023). First and foremost, it contains implementations of major ABC voting rules. These are voting rules that accept as input approval ballots, that is, the (binary) preferences of voters expressing which candidates they like or support. The output is a fixed-size subset of candidates, called a committee. Different ABC voting rules represent different approaches how such a committee should be formed. For example, there is a trade-off between selecting only widely supported candidates and choosing a committee that represent as many voters as possible (Lackner & Skowron, 2020). Much of the recent research has focussed on developing ABC voting rules that reflect the preferences of voters in a proportional fashion.Lackner et al. (2023). abcvoting: A Python package for approval-based multi-winner voting rules.

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“…Hence, ideally, in a committee satisfying proportional representation each agent that is included in some -cohesive group (for any ∈ [k] ) has a happiness score of at least . Since this ideal is not always achievable (Aziz et al 2017;Brill et al 2022b), the axioms proportional justified representation (Sánchez-Fernández et al 2017) and extended justified representation (Aziz et al 2017) capture relaxations of this ideal. Core stability strengthens these two axioms by additionally requiring proportional representation for non-cohesive groups:…”

Section: Axioms From Multiwinner Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Proportional representation in matching markets: selecting multiple matchings under dichotomous preferences

2023

Self Cite

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Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding k matchings fairly representing everyone’s preferences. To formalize fairness, we apply the concept of proportional representation as studied in approval-based multiwinner elections. To this end, we model the problem as a multiwinner election where the set of candidates consists of matchings of the agents, and agents’ preferences over each other are lifted to preferences over matchings. Due to the exponential number of candidates in such elections, standard algorithms for classical sequential voting rules (such as those proposed by Thiele and Phragmén) are rendered inefficient. We show that the computational tractability of these rules can be regained by exploiting the structure of the approval preferences. Moreover, we establish algorithmic results and axiomatic guarantees that go beyond those obtainable in the classical approval-based multiwinner setting: Assuming that approvals are symmetric, we show that Proportional Approval Voting (PAV), a well-established but computationally intractable voting rule, becomes polynomial-time computable, and that its sequential variant, which does not provide any proportionality guarantees in general, fulfills a rather strong guarantee known as extended justified representation. Some of our algorithmic results extend to other types of compactly representable elections with an exponential candidate space.

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Individual Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting

Cited by 8 publications

References 7 publications

The (Computational) Social Choice Take on Indivisible Participatory Budgeting

The (Computational) Social Choice Take on Indivisible Participatory Budgeting

abcvoting: A Python package for approval-based multi-winner voting rules

Proportional representation in matching markets: selecting multiple matchings under dichotomous preferences

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