Individual preferences for political redistribution

Limits to redistribution in a democracy: a survey

“…As a consequence, the immediate gains from tax-financed transfers may be dominated by the induced effects on the equilibrium allocation. 28 For empirical support of this argument, see Corneo and Grüner (2002).…”

Do fairness and race matter in generosity? Evidence from a nationally representative charity experiment

“…Empirically, people support more redistribution from the rich to the poor when they believe that poverty is caused by exogenous circumstances, as opposed to factors under volitional control. This is the case in both survey data and laboratory experiments on voting for redistribution with monetary stakes (Williamson, 1974;Heclo, 1986;Gilens, 1999;Alesina et al, 2001;Fong, 2001;Corneo and Grüner, 2002;Durante and Putterman, 2008). 2 Meanwhile, findings from laboratory experiments on private giving of money show that subjects allocate more to recipients who, for various reasons, might be perceived as having greater moral worth (Hoffman et al, 1994;Eckel and Grossman, 1996;Fong, 2007;Cherry and Shogren, 2008;Fong and Oberholzer, 2009).…”

Political Preferences and the Aging of Populations

“…First and foremost, "income" captures, unsurprisingly, a person's income. Since income in the ISSP data is measured in national currencies, I follow Corneo and Gruner (2002) in standardizing it by calculating ln( y ī y ), where y i stands for an individual's income. This variable is important because it not only captures important economic differences between the respondents, but it also is a proxy for private saving.…”