Individual Essence: gibt es solche?

Ujvári, Márta

doi:10.1007/s12133-012-0107-9

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…This kind of essence differs from what Roca-Royes (2011) refers to as 'sufficient for existence' essences. It also differs from what is sometimes called the 'individual essence' of the phenomenon (Losonsky 1987;Hawthorne 2001;Ujvári 2013).…”

Section: 'Essence'mentioning

confidence: 91%

Counterfactual similarity, nomic indiscernibility, and the paradox of quidditism

Bassford

Dolson

2021

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Aristotle is essentially human; that is, for all possible worlds metaphysically consistent with our own, if Aristotle exists, then he is human. This is a claim about the essential property of an object. The claim that objects have essential properties has been hotly disputed, but for present purposes, we can bracket that issue. In this essay, we are interested, rather, in the question of whether properties themselves have essential properties (or features) for their existence. We call those who suppose they do 'property essentialists'; those who do not, 'property anti-essentialists,' or 'quidditists.' We offer two complementary arguments. Our total argument is under-girded by two assumptions: transworld identity theory and 'received view' counterfactual semantics, a la David Lewis. We then argue that, if one presumes that these are true, then one risks running headlong into paradox if one also accepts property anti-essentialism. That's the first argument. By contrast, if one accepts these same assumptions in conjunction with property essentialism, then the paradox is avoided. This is the second argument. We take it that our arguments work to show that, between property essentialism and quidditism, the property essentialist is on better footing. Plausibly, properties themselves do have essential properties for their existence.

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Section: 'Essence'mentioning

confidence: 91%

Counterfactual similarity, nomic indiscernibility, and the paradox of quidditism

Bassford

Dolson

2021

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“…Apart from evading this charge, a positive support for positing qualitative individual essences can be found in the form of the ontic or metaphysical version of explanation. The explanatory role of the qualitative features has already been explored (Ujvári 2013a), but now I think that the explanatory approach can be strengthened with the metaphysically committing version. In this version the epistemic reading of explanation is replaced by its ontic reading; this represents also a decisive step in the essentialist-explanatory account of modalities.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…A further argument, in favor of the qualitative view, rests on the presumed analogy between modal explanations for continuants by appealing to their individual essence and explanation of singular event causation by appealing to individual event essences (Ujvári 2013a). Though the analogy has some appeal, it has not gained universal acceptance.…”

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confidence: 99%

Explanation and Individual Essence

Ujvári

2018

EuJAP

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In this paper I show that a novel ontic reading of explanation, intending to capture the de re essential features of individuals, can support the qualitative view of individual essences. It is argued further that the putative harmful consequences of the Leibniz Principle (PII) and its converse for the qualitative view can be avoided, provided that individual essences are not construed in the style of the naïve bundle theory with set-theoretical identity- conditions. Adopting either the more sophisticated two-tier BT or, alternatively, the neo-Aristotelian position of taking essences as natures in the Aristotelian sense, can help to evade these main charges against the qualitative view. The functional parallels with the alternative haecceitistic view of individuation and individual essence will also be considered.

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“…(The remark was made to me in conversation, but the idea seems to be among the assumptions of Ujvári, 2013).…”

Section: Haecceitism Does Not Exclude Individualitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“… Fine (2005): 31. See also, among others,Ujvári (2013) andRussell (2017).154 Dasgupta (2009): 35.155 Fine (2005): 31. See alsoArmstrong (1989): 59.…”

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confidence: 95%

Haecceitism as a Theory of Individual Essences

Scarpati¹

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Individual Essence: gibt es solche?

Cited by 5 publications

References 13 publications

Counterfactual similarity, nomic indiscernibility, and the paradox of quidditism

Counterfactual similarity, nomic indiscernibility, and the paradox of quidditism

Explanation and Individual Essence

Haecceitism as a Theory of Individual Essences

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