2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2015.04.012
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Individual choice and reputation distribution of cooperative behaviors among heterogeneous groups

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Cited by 19 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Resorting to the powerful mathematical framework of evolutionary game theory, researchers have invested much effort in exploring this problem [3][4][5][6][7][8]. Since the seminal work on spatial games [9], traditional explorations of the evolution of cooperation on ideal structureless (well-mixed) populations [3][4][5][6] are moved to structured cases where individuals are constrained to play with their first or second order of neighbors [10][11][12][13][14][15]. With the discovery of topologies embedded in human interactions in the real society [16][17][18][19], many further investigations have been carried out in various complex networks where nodes indicate individuals and links represent neighborhoods [20][21][22][23].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Resorting to the powerful mathematical framework of evolutionary game theory, researchers have invested much effort in exploring this problem [3][4][5][6][7][8]. Since the seminal work on spatial games [9], traditional explorations of the evolution of cooperation on ideal structureless (well-mixed) populations [3][4][5][6] are moved to structured cases where individuals are constrained to play with their first or second order of neighbors [10][11][12][13][14][15]. With the discovery of topologies embedded in human interactions in the real society [16][17][18][19], many further investigations have been carried out in various complex networks where nodes indicate individuals and links represent neighborhoods [20][21][22][23].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Specifically, knowledge agents decide whether or not to engage in knowledge transfer by considering the reputation of their neighbors. To explain the influence of reputation mechanisms on interorganizational knowledge transfer, we analyze reputation distribution [42,56], reputation multiplicative factor [39], and reputation decaying rate [57].…”
Section: Reputation Mechanismsmentioning
confidence: 99%