Individual and Cross-Cultural Differences in Semantic Intuitions: New Experimental Findings

Beebe, James R.; Undercoffer, Ryan

doi:10.1163/15685373-12342182

Cited by 18 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Though the nature and structure of these arguments are diverse, they all call into question in various ways the use of intuitions as evidence in philosophical discourse. At present writing, diversity in philosophical intuitions has been reported for ethnicity (Weinberg et al 2001;Machery et al 2004Machery et al , 2009Machery et al , 2010Mallon et al 2009;Beebe and Undercoffer ms;Sytsma et al ms;Waterman et al ms), gender (Zamzow and Nichols 2009;Buckwalter and Stich 2013), personality (Feltz and Cokely 2009), and philosophical background (Nichols et al 2003). We now add intuiter's age to the list of factors that may mark differences in intuition.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 91%

Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments

Colaço¹,

Buckwalter²,

Stich³

et al. 2014

Episteme

109

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In epistemology, fake-barn thought experiments are often taken to be intuitively clear cases in which a justified true belief does not qualify as knowledge. We report a study designed to determine whether members of the general public share this intuition. The data suggest that while participants are less inclined to attribute knowledge in fake-barn cases than in unproblematic cases of knowledge, they nonetheless do attribute knowledge to protagonists in fake-barn cases. Moreover, the intuition that fake-barn cases do count as knowledge is negatively correlated with age; older participants are less likely than younger participants to attribute knowledge in fake-barn cases. We also found that increasing the number of defeaters (fakes) does not decrease the inclination to attribute knowledge.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 91%

Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments

Colaço¹,

Buckwalter²,

Stich³

et al. 2014

Episteme

109

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“…Subsequent experiments, varying the stimuli and the populations, have replicated this pattern (e.g. Machery, et al, 2010;Beebe & Undercoffer, 2015;2016;Sytsma, et al, 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 86%

What is in a name? The Development of Cross-Cultural Differences in Referential Intuitions

Li¹,

Liu²,

Chalmers³

et al. 2017

Preprint

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Past work has shown systematic differences between Easterners' and Westerners' intuitions about the reference of proper names. Understanding when these differences emerge in development will help us understand their origins. In the present study, we investigate the referential intuitions of English-and Chinese-speaking children and adults in the U.S. andChina. Using a truth-value judgement task modelled on Kripke's classic Gödel case, we find that the cross-cultural differences are already in place at age seven. Thus, these differences cannot be attributed to later education or enculturation. Instead, they must stem from differences that are present in early childhood. We consider alternate theories of reference that are com patible with these findings and discuss the possibility that the cross-cultural differences reflect differences in perspective-taking strategies.

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“…There are good reasons to question aspects of the experimental design used in Machery et al (2004). However, experiments that attempt to disambiguate speaker's reference and semantic reference (Machery et al, 2015), and disambiguate relevant epistemic perspectives (Beebe and Undercoffer, 2015;Machery et al, 2015;Sytsma et al, 2014) replicate the findings of cross-cultural and intra-cultural variation in participants' responses to Gödel-type stories. If the results of these recent experiments hold up, then this would appear to be a case in which an imperfectly designed experiment uncovers evidence of a phenomenon that is confirmed by more carefully designed experiments.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…: 27 March 2017 variation in responses to versions of the Gödel story, even while employing Sytsma and Livengood's "clarified narrator's perspective" prompt(Beebe and Undercoffer, 2015;Sytsma et al, 2015).…”

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confidence: 99%

Experimental Philosophy of Language

Hansen¹

2015

Oxford Handbooks Online

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Experimental philosophy of language uses experimental methods developed in the cognitive sciences to investigate topics of interest to philosophers of language. This article describes the methodological background for the development of experimental approaches to topics in philosophy of language, distinguishes negative and positive projects in experimental philosophy of language, and evaluates recent experimental work that concerns the reference of proper names and natural kind terms. The reliability of expert linguistic judgments versus the linguistic judgments of ordinary speakers, the role that different forms of ambiguity play in influencing responses to experiments, and the reliability of metalinguistic judgments are also assessed.

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Individual and Cross-Cultural Differences in Semantic Intuitions: New Experimental Findings

Abstract: keywords: semantics, philosophy of language, cross-cultural, experimental philosophy * We would like to thank…

Cited by 18 publications

References 26 publications

Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments

Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments

What is in a name? The Development of Cross-Cultural Differences in Referential Intuitions

Experimental Philosophy of Language

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