Indiscernibility Does Not Distinguish Particularity

Giberman, Daniel

doi:10.1002/tht3.219

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 13 publications

(16 reference statements)

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“…In particular, according to classic Armstrong's theory, properties are universals yet possess casual powers, or are even individualized by their abilities to enter causal relationships (see Armstrong 1978, 47-50). Furthermore, even if one accepts that causal powers can be attributed only to particularized instances of properties, a reverse problem is still present, namely that it is not obvious that all particulars have causal powers, because while it is common to treat certain abstract entities, such as numbers (see Melia 2008;Giberman 2016), as particulars, it is debatable that they can enter casual relations. Hence, characteristics such as mindindependence or having causal powers do not seem to be identical to the particularity, rather they are associated with some types of particulars.…”

Section: Generic Particularitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceptual experiences of particularity

Skrzypulec

2021

Inquiry

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Philosophers of perception often claim that usual perceptual experiences not only present particulars but also phenomenally present them as particulars. Nevertheless, despite the initial plausibility of this thesis, it is not clear what exactly it means to say that particularity is phenomenally presented. The paper aims to provide a deeper analysis of the claim that perceptual experiences phenomenally present objects as particulars. In doing so, I distinguish two theses regarding phenomenally presented particularity: Generic Particularity and Specific Particularity. According to the first thesis, vision phenomenally presents particularity of objects, understood as a general characteristic that may be shared by many entities. The second thesis states that vision phenomenally presents particularity of objects, understood as an individual characteristic unique to each particular. I argue that, relying on knowledge concerning the functioning of perceptual mechanisms, vision does not phenomenally present generic particularity but it has certain abilities for presenting specific particularity.

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Section: Generic Particularitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceptual experiences of particularity

Skrzypulec

2021

Inquiry

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“…Analogously, it can be accepted that in the case of tropes, qualitative sameness does not entail identity without making any commitment to the idea of multiple instantiation. Because of this independence, and the fact that philosophers still debate which of the described approaches is the most accurate (see Giberman, 2016), for the purpose of this article I adopt the following disjunctive characterization of the trope interpretation of visual properties:…”

Section: Tropes and Universalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tropes, Universals and Visual Phenomenology

Skrzypulec

2020

Theoria

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Tropes, Universals, and Visual Phenomenology Philosophers of perception who believe that visual states are representations usually also accept that visual states present that some properties are instantiated. However, a proper philosophical account of such "visual properties" is lacking. An important question concerns whether visual properties should be characterized as universals, i.e. as properties that can be instantiated multiple times, or as tropes, i.e. individualized properties that are not multiply instantiable. While some philosophers adopt an agnostic stance towards this issue (e.g., Siegel 2010, pp. 58-59), in recent decades various authors have developed arguments aiming to show that visual properties should be characterized as tropes (Lowe 1998, 2008; Mulligan 1999; Nanay 2012). One argument for the trope interpretation, which will be the focus of this paper, is the claim that the way in which we visually experience properties makes it plausible to characterize them as tropes. For instance, it has been stated that when visually experiencing an object as having a property, we are not phenomenally presented with a relation of instantiation between an universal and an object (Mulligan et al. 1984), and that the perceptual phenomenon of visual-property constancy provides a reason to accept the trope interpretation of visual properties (Almäng 2016).

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“…To say that x and y are qualitative duplicates is not to say that x and y share the same intrinsic qualitative properties. 28 28 Daniel Giberman (2016) and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2017) argue that Williams's account of the universal/particular distinction fails. I reply that Williams's account is not essential to the theory of universals that follows.…”

Section: Indispensability Of Abstractnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Abstractaand Abstraction in Trope Theory

Fisher

2019

Philosophical Papers

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Trope theory is a leading metaphysical theory in analytic ontology. One of its classic statements is found in the work of Donald C. Williams who argued that tropes qua abstract particulars are the very alphabet of being. The concept of an abstract particular has been repeatedly attacked in the literature. Opponents and proponents of trope theory alike have levelled their criticisms at the abstractness of tropes and the associated act of abstraction. In this paper I defend the concept of a trope qua abstract particular by rejecting arguments that purport to show that tropes should not be understood as abstract and by arguing that the abstractness of tropes plays an indispensable role in one of our more promising tropetheoretic analyses of universals and of concrete objects.

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Indiscernibility Does Not Distinguish Particularity

Cited by 7 publications

References 13 publications

Perceptual experiences of particularity

Perceptual experiences of particularity

Tropes, Universals and Visual Phenomenology

Abstractaand Abstraction in Trope Theory

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