Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals

Fishman, Michael

doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(03)00246-7

Cited by 72 publications

(59 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…With a certain probability , they fail to implement an intended help. Following Leimar and Hammerstein (2001), Iwasa (2004, 2006) and Panchanathan and Boyd (2003), we assume that an intended refusal is always carried out (see also Fishman et al (2001), Fishman (2003) and Lotem et al (1999)). Finally, we assume that from time to time, a randomly chosen individual switches strategy by adopting the strategy i of a model chosen with a probability proportional to that model's fitness F i = (1 − s)F + sP i .…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

Uchida¹,

Sigmund

2010

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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Indirect reciprocity is one of the basic mechanisms to sustain mutual cooperation.Beneficial acts are returned, not by the recipient, but by third parties. Indirect reciprocity is based on reputation and status: it pays to provide help because this makes one more likely to receive help in turn. The mechanism depends on knowing the past behavior of other players, and assessing that behavior. There are many different systems of assessing other individuals, which can be interpreted as rudimentary moral systems (i.e. views on what is 'good' or 'bad'). In this paper, we describe the competition of some of the leading assessment rules called SUGDEN and KANDORI by analytic methods. We show that the sterner rule KANDORI has a slight advantage in the sense that KANDORI-players have more chance to earn higher payoff than SUGDEN-players in the presence of unconditional altruists. On the other hand, we see that the unconditional altruists are eliminated in the long run and that stable polymorphisms of KANDORI and SUGDEN can subsist, but that a moral consensus is realized even in those polymorphic states: all players' images are the same in each observer's eyes.

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Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

Uchida¹,

Sigmund

2010

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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“…That study showed that indirectly reciprocal cooperation based on a discriminating strategy, which only allows cooperation with an individual who has a good image score, evolves through the effect of reputation and results in a stably cooperative society, even though pairs of individuals interact only a few times. Subsequent to their work, various studies have specifically examined the indirect reciprocity theory (Lotem et al 1999;Leimar & Hammerstein 2001;Fishman 2003;Mohtashemi & Mui 2003;Panchanathan & Boyd 2003;Brandt & Sigmund 2004;Johnstone & Bishary 2004;Ohtsuki 2004;Ohtsuki & Iwasa 2004). Moreover, Nakamaru & Kawata (2004) showed that rumours have a great effect on the evolution of cooperation in human societies in which individuals can transmit rumours to others and can spread false rumours.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation and the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

Suzuki

Akiyama

2005

Proc. R. Soc. B.

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The evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas has been of considerable concern in various fields such as sociobiology, economics and sociology. It might be that, in the real world, reputation plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation. Recently, studies that have addressed indirect reciprocity have revealed that cooperation can evolve through reputation, even though pairs of individuals interact only a few times. To our knowledge, most indirect reciprocity models have presumed dyadic interaction; no studies have attempted analysis of the evolution of cooperation in large communities where the effect of reputation is included. We investigate the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups in which the reputation of individuals affects the decision-making process. This paper presents the following: (i) cooperation can evolve in a four-person case, (ii) the evolution of cooperation becomes difficult as group size increases, even if the effect of reputation is included, and (iii) three kinds of final social states exist. In medium-sized communities, cooperative species can coexist in a stable manner with betrayal species.

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“…f i,i+1 is convex up to a valuep i,i+1 ∈ [0, 1] and then concave. 16 Here, π(j|i, i + 1) denotes the payoff of a single j-discriminator in the equilibrium population mixture of i-and (i + 1)-discriminators. 17 Note that since m > i + 1 we know that i + 1 < n.…”

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confidence: 99%