India, the Indo-Pacific and the Quad

Abstract

The term 'Indo-Pacific', recently in fashion, describes a supposedly vital and contiguous strategic arena encompassing the eastern Indian and Western Pacific oceans. Accompanying the concept is the notion of a revived partnership: the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the United States, Australia, India and Japan (or 'Quad'). One of these countries is not like the others. India's maritime interests and strategy sit uneasily with those of the other Quad powers. India's is an Indian Ocean vision, rather than an Indo-Pacific vision. Bound by the strategic primacy of the Indian Ocean and by the constraints on its sea-power projection, in the short term, India's engagement with the Indo-Pacific framework will remain largely diplomatic, economic and rhetorical. India's core strategic focus lies west of the Strait of Malacca. The return of the Quad The Quad, previously initiated in 2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and discontinued after the withdrawal of Australia under then-prime minister Kevin Rudd, was revived at a meeting of senior diplomats from the four nations on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila in November 2017, resulting in parallel commitments to maintain a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific. 1 The Indo-Pacific construct is partly material, reflecting a vast increase in activity along the sea lines of communication that link the two oceanic regions in trade and energyand in turn, it is partly strategic, as this greater interdependence brings greater vulnerability and risk. Yet the currency of the Indo-Pacific idea lies also in its framing as a space of shared values. Prime Minister Abe's now widely cited 'Confluence of the Two Seas' speech, delivered before the Indian parliament in 2007, spoke not only of the 'dynamic coupling' of the Indian and Pacific oceans, but also of their identity as 'seas of freedom and of prosperity'. 2 Australia's 2017 foreign-policy White Paper referred to a vision of an 'open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific region, in which the rights of all states are respected'. 3 US President Donald Trump's five-nation tour of Asia late last year was punctuated by his frequent invocation of the phrase 'free and open Indo-Pacific region'. 4 And India's press release in response to the November quadrilateral meeting declared that 'a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region serves the long-term interests of all countries in the region and of the world at large'. 5 Two ideas are implicit in this values-based framing: one about China, the other about India. Firstly, despite claims from the White House that the term is 'certainly not' 6 an effort to contain China's influence, it is clear that the Indo-Pacific construct is a response to perceptions that China is deploying infrastructure development and investments in the region for geopolitical gain, and that Beijing is, at best, weakly committed to a rules-based international order, particularly in the maritime domain. Secondly, in a way that the term 'Asia-Pacific' did not, 'Indo-Pacific' explici...

India’s security dilemma: engaging big powers while retaining strategic autonomy

“…Traditionally, India has been an Indian Ocean-centric power, and its vision and strategy is mainly confined to the Indian Ocean. Maritime security and strategic balancing in the Pacific maritime theatre still appear to be beyond India’s capability, so in the short term its engagement will largely remain confined to ‘diplomatic, economic and rhetorical’ levels (Roy-Chaudhury and Sullivan de Estrada 2018 , 181).…”

Why Quasi-Alliances Will Persist in the Indo-Pacific? The Fall and Rise of the Quad

“…For one, Sino-Pakistan relations are to New Delhi’s great dismay, featuring a defence and security dimension, including material support of the Pakistani military. Strategically, the BRI’s China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) seeks to link China via Pakistan to the Indian Ocean and causes great concern in New Delhi (Roy-Chaudhury & Sullivan de Estrada, 2018). Secondly, the five decades old and still unresolved Sino-Indian border dispute in the Himalayas is largest territorial dispute in the region and a site of regular incidents.…”

“…For India, the Indo-Pacific concept developed in conjunction with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Act East agenda, which aims to reinvigorate its ties with Southeast and East Asia; essentially a recognition of the need to become more active east of Malacca and to push back against China’s activities in the region (Pande, 2020). Similar to Japan, the current Indian leadership aspires to become a leading power in the Indian Ocean and is equally seeking to take on greater responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific (Roy-Chaudhury & Sullivan de Estrada, 2018). Of course, the problem with greater Indian responsibility in the IPR is that successive Indian administrations have been unclear whether they are prepared to pay the price of confronting China that seeks to extend its influence, inter alia, along the LAC.…”

Sailing Together or Ships Passing in the Night? India and the United States in Southeast Asia

“…Expectations of close Indo-U.S. cooperation in Southeast Asia overlook both the limits to their partnership and the constraints on India's ability to play a significant role east of the Strait of Malacca. 82 Asian states want other major powers to remain engaged in the region to hedge against political domination by Beijing. 83 The presence of multiple rising powers, competing territorial claims, and nationalism means that the region is likely to witness a protracted great-power competition for influence.…”