Indexical Truth and Antimetaphysical Inclinations

Rosenhagen, Raja

doi:10.1515/9783110326222.81

Cited by 2 publications

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“…Given the conjunction of theses i) and ii), that is, that science represents the empirical phenomenon as "embedded" in certain abstract structures, on the one hand, and that abstract structures are described only by isomorphism, on the other, a question immediately arises: How can an abstract structure represent phenomena, that is, entities of a physical nature? The problem is not new and has been pointed out by several authors (Rosenhagen 2006;Barrett 2009;Turn 2009;Nguyen 2016;Ghins 2016). Van Fraassen, of course, is aware of it and expresses the difficulty in the following terms: How can an abstract entity, such as a mathematical structure, represent something that is not abstract, that is, something that is found in nature?…”

Section: The Loss Of Reality Objection and The Pragmatic Tautologymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Scope of the Construction of Experience in Empiricist Structuralism

Gentile

2018

Principia

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In his attempt to put forward an empiricist version of structuralism, van Fraassen develops an approach to scientific representation and models which has been the object of several critiques. Here we cover the “Loss of Reality Objection”, namely, that reality itself would play no role in science if science could only refer to mathematical models. We examine and dismiss the solution offered by van Fraassen. Finally, we offer an alternative solution path.

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Section: The Loss Of Reality Objection and The Pragmatic Tautologymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Scope of the Construction of Experience in Empiricist Structuralism

Gentile

2018

Principia

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Constructive Empiricism and Deflationary Truth

Asay¹

2009

Philos. of Sci.

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Constructive empiricists claim to offer a reconstruction of the aim and practice of science without adopting all the metaphysical commitments of scientific realism. Deflationists about truth boast of the ability to offer a full account of the nature of truth without adopting the metaphysical commitments accompanying substantive accounts. Though the two views would form an attractive package, I argue that the pairing is not possible: constructive empiricism requires a substantive account of truth. I articulate what sort of account of truth and empirical adequacy the constructive empiricist must offer and then show why deflationists cannot uphold such an account.

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Indexical Truth and Antimetaphysical Inclinations

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

The Scope of the Construction of Experience in Empiricist Structuralism

The Scope of the Construction of Experience in Empiricist Structuralism

Constructive Empiricism and Deflationary Truth

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