Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity and Abelardian Predicates

Noonan, Harold W.

doi:10.2307/2219592

Cited by 81 publications

(28 citation statements)

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“…So we could treat the resemblance of properties/potatoes as context dependent, such that when we use certain subject terms to refer to the entities (' Crimson ', ' Scarlet ', ' Cyan ') a sentence featuring the predicate is to be evaluated one way whereas when the subject terms are different ('Potato a ', 'Potato c ', 'Potato b ') the sentence is evaluated differently even though the subject terms refer to the same entities (as Crimson = a , Scarlet = c , and Cyan = b ). In such cases we say the predicate is 'Abelardian' (Noonan 1991(Noonan , 1993. Conciliation has been achieved.…”

Section: The Context Shift Solutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods

Daly¹

2015

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Section: The Context Shift Solutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods

Daly¹

2015

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“…According to the nominalist explanation of Noonan, tracing back to Abelard, modal predicates express different properties does not introduce this claim into her argument for immaterial parts". Donnelly (2011, 233, footnote 10). in such semantically differing contexts (Noonan 1991). And it is all too obvious that the Leibniz Law is not formulated with semantic sensitivity required to evaluate the attribution of such properties.…”

Section: Asymmetry Claim Parity Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mereological Principles in Metaphysics

Ujvári

2014

Metaphysica

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The relevance of mereology for metaphysics is a perennial theme. In particular, the part-whole relation is applied recently to colocated qua-objects of different sortals: say, a statue and its constituting piece of clay. K. Koslicki (2008. The structure of objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press) claims that only the lump is part of the statue; moreover, its proper part, but not vice versa since the statue has an immaterial part not shared by the lump. She backs her claim by appealing to the weak supplementation principle (WSP). M. Donnelly (2011. "Using mereological principles to support metaphysics." The philosophical quarterly 61:225-46) is critical with the asymmetry argument. I point out that the asymmetry argument trades on the equivocity of the very notion of "part". In the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition Koslicki's neoAristotelianism appeals to, "part" shows up with various meanings not all of them admitting the mereological reading of "part" her argument hinges on. With her argument, the absurd consequence ensues that the lump can also be shown to have an immaterial part not shared by the statue. I show that the presumed immaterial parts cannot be proper parts of composites, only their improper parts. Thus they fail to fall under (WSP). My ultimate goal is to disentangle the mereological and the metaphysical threads by showing what goes with what without taking sides either with the mereologist or the traditional metaphysician.

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“…But, again, there is a well-known solution to it already out there in the literature and accepted by many. It is defended most thoroughly by Noonan (1991) 19 but is accepted by Lewis (1986) too, 20 amongst others. In short, the solution is to say that the predicate '____ could have survived being squashed into a ball' changes its meaning depending upon the objectterm it is attached to.…”

Section: Burgess' Argument Against Overlap Of Distinct Kinds Rejectedmentioning

confidence: 99%