Indeterminacy and Failure of Grounding

Abstract

Cases of grounding failure present a puzzle for fundamental metaphysics. Typically, solutions are thought to lie either in adding ontology such as haecceities or in re‐describing the cases by means of the ideology of metaphysical indeterminacy. The controversial status of haecceities has led some to favour metaphysical indeterminacy as the way to solve the puzzle. We consider two further treatments of grounding failure each of which, we argue, is a more plausible alternative. As such, the initial dichotomy is a false one, and these alternative options deserve consideration before resorting to the heavyweight machinery of metaphysical indeterminacy.

From indeterminacy in a fundamental theory to fundamental indeterminacy?

“…I argue that more needs to be shown to establish that F+ indeed 'covers' P any more than F does. It is not clear to me whether explicitly stating that P is indeterminate adds anything more 16 Also see Assadian and Nassim (2019) for other responses to Barnes' case for FI based on the grounding failure case.…”