Independent Verification of Safety Critical Elements (Russian)

Marty, Julien; Theys, Sophie Odile Paule; Bucherie, Christian; Bolsover, Andy; Cambos, Philippe

doi:10.2118/136392-ru

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…The proposed framework addressed identified gaps in literature reviewed by the authors with the introduction of some new features as presented such as; A hierarchical asset definition proposed to allow hazard identification; A step-by-step way of identifying major accident hazards for an offshore asset; A progressive way of identifying SCEs and estimating their criticality; Definition of performance standards, identification of means of performance assurance and identification of means of verification with illustrations. Marty et al (2010) used verification activities, (independent verification) to help substantiate that current oil and gas best practices are being used, to provide assurance that facilities have been designed to operate safely and to ensure that all HSE risks have been managed to ALARP level [9]. A background on UK legislation prior to the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988 was presented against performance-based legislation introduced as a result of the disaster.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk-Based Verification of Subsea Blowout Preventer System

2017

IJASRE

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An enquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster in 1998 led to a new approach of goal setting safety legislation which forms the framework adopted by offshore regulators especially United Kingdom, to address and manage risks of Major Accident Hazards (MAH). This enhanced the concept of verification in general and Risk Based Verification (RBV) in particular. This paper presents the application of this concept of verification to the Blowout Preventer (BOP) which undoubtedly is the final line of defence against major accident of a blowout in offshore drilling for the management of MAHs. This research begins with a review of current trends in offshore safety regulations, a discussion on the concept of verification principles, benefits and RBV. A RBV framework is proposed for the management of hazards in a blowout

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk-Based Verification of Subsea Blowout Preventer System

2017

IJASRE

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“…2 Safety measures are implemented to control risks by preventing and reducing the impact of major accidents. 3 According to the Commonwealth of Australia Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation 2019 and UK HSE Regulation for Offshore Petroleum Platforms, the oil and gas industry is highly regulated in terms of safety systems management. Therefore, safety barriers must be able to manage risk according to the lowest level principle (as low as reasonably practicable or ALARP).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This low likelihood is due to the implementation of multiple layers of protection in the form of safety barriers 2 . Safety measures are implemented to control risks by preventing and reducing the impact of major accidents 3 . According to the Commonwealth of Australia Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation 2019 and UK HSE Regulation for Offshore Petroleum Platforms, the oil and gas industry is highly regulated in terms of safety systems management.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implementation of quantitative risk and cost–benefit analysis in an aging offshore facility

Lazuardi,

Kumaraningrum,

Hermansyah

2023

Process Safety Progress

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Riser shutdown valves (SDVs) are installed to isolate hydrocarbon through a subsea pipeline or to protect platforms and personnel from an unintended release of hydrocarbons. Unfortunately, the volume of gas leaking through the SDV is sometimes beyond the predetermined criteria. Therefore, a quantitative risk assessment is needed by conducting cost–benefit analysis (CBA). This is the methodology of this study. First, we carry out a frequency analysis to calculate the frequency of release from an isolatable section using an estimate of the release frequency, event tree analysis, and escalation from consequence modeling. Second, we study the consequences of modeling. Third, we carry out risk analysis and evaluation. Fourth, we do CBA calculation. Fifth, we consider the other perspectives. The results of this study can predict the possibility of riser SDV leakage in offshore facilities during the aging period and optimize operating and investment costs while maintaining safety to reduce the possibility of fire explosions. It poses a challenge because of the complexity of operational systems involving multiple potential contributors and multiple safety measures. The study results show that the probability of fire prediction at SDV with processing facilities increases from 8.10 × 10−09 to 7.93 × 10−05 for the worst case scenario. Case studies show that application of the CBA model can be used to optimize the allocation of safety investments.

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A Suitable Model for Assessing the Integrity of Subsea Control Modules SCMs for Re-Use after Decommissioning

Root

Andrawus

Iyalla

2021

Day 2 Tue, August 03, 2021

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This paper proposes a model for assessing Subsea Control Module (SCM) integrity for re-use after decommissioning. The SCM is one of the most failure-prone components in subsea oil and gas developments, and although a relatively inexpensive component in a Subsea Production System (SPS), the failure of an SCM can require production to be ceased, significantly impacting project economics. The re-use of decommissioned SCMs could improve the economics of subsea oil and gas projects by reducing design and manufacturing lead times, improving production availability, and enabling the economic exploitation of both marginal and mature fields. Insights gained through relevant literature, industry standards, and subsea industry experts led to the development of the Integrity Assessment Model for Decommissioned Subsea Control Modules proposed in this paper. The model is based on an Integrity Assessment process as well as a Risk-Based Compatibility Assessment. Discussions include a background of the SCM and common failures, the economics of SCM re-use, and Applications for the re-use of SCMs. The Integrity Assessment Model is described in detail, as well as the benefits and limitations. Areas of future research in support of subsea equipment re-use are identified, including improvements to reliability databases for subsea equipment, and the creation of a quantitative metric describing subsea equipment integrity.

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Independent Verification of Safety Critical Elements (Russian)

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

Risk-Based Verification of Subsea Blowout Preventer System

Risk-Based Verification of Subsea Blowout Preventer System

Implementation of quantitative risk and cost–benefit analysis in an aging offshore facility

A Suitable Model for Assessing the Integrity of Subsea Control Modules SCMs for Re-Use after Decommissioning

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