Independent or collaborative management? Regional management strategy for ocean carbon sink trading based on game theory

Can multi-agent cooperation promote the ecological value realization of blue carbon in marine ranching?

“…Regarding the research assumptions, this paper draws on the study of non-cooperative and cooperative game theory method [ 58 , 59 ] to propose the assumptions. Yu et al assume that the blue carbon production cost of the ocean ranching enterprise as a quadratic function of the blue carbon output [ 56 ], which is the same as this research. Unlike linear function in Wan's research [ 57 ], this study assumes the operating cost of blue carbon trading platform is a quadratic function.…”

“…Blue carbon has positive spatial spillover effects. Yu et al [ 56 ] analyzed the blue carbon cooperative governance between neighboring regions using game theory. They concluded that the effect of blue carbon cooperative governance in neighboring regions is greater than that of independent governance.…”

“…Drawing from the research on blue carbon sink trading [ 56 ], we assumes that the blue carbon production cost of the marine ranching enterprise as a quadratic function about the blue carbon output, and its cost function is , where is the blue carbon output and is the production cost coefficient. The marine ranching enterprise obtains blue carbon revenue by trading through the platform, and its revenue function is , where is the blue carbon trading price.…”

“…Drawing from the research of carbon trading platform participation motivating blue carbon trading of marine ranching [ 56 , 57 ], this paper assumes that the blue carbon trading platform charges commissions based on trading volume, and its revenue function is , where is the commission coefficient of the trading platform. The operating cost of the blue carbon trading platform is a quadratic function about the commission coefficient, and its cost function is , where is the transaction cost coefficient of the platform.…”

Study on Emission Control of Berthing Vessels-Based on Non-cooperative Game Theory

“…To develop appropriate emission reduction policies, the factors influencing ship emissions need to be clarified. These factors include switching to low-sulfur fuel oil [26], the implementation of subsidies for shipping companies [27,28], monitoring by maritime authorities [29][30][31][32] and regional cooperation [33]. Dragovic et al analyzed vessel-source emissions from two Nordic cruise ports and found that factors such as berth availability and berth accessibility affect the level of ship emissions [34].…”