Independent directors’ board networks and controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior

Chen, Yunsen; Wang, Yutao; Lin, Li

doi:10.1016/j.cjar.2013.09.002

Cited by 39 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Boateng and Huang (2017) found that the existence of multiple non-controlling large shareholders in a company restricted the ability of controlling shareholders to practice tunnelling. Similarly, Chen et al (2014) found positive effects of independent directors on controlling tunnelling. Although such effectiveness of independent board members may be limited if they are appointed by the CEO, interlocked, older in age, or hold multiple board memberships (Core et al, 1999), several studies showed positive effects of independent board members.…”

Section: H2: Financial Leverage Is Positively Associated With the Eximentioning

confidence: 86%

Listening Skills: Accountancy Educators in Retreat?

Reddrop¹,

Mapunda²

2019

AABFJ

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This study aims to explore the financial and governance factors that determine related party transactions (RPTs) in the developing country context of Jordan.. To do so, a multiple regression model was developed and used. Results show that RPTs are negatively related with CEO-duality and board independence, while they are positively related with firm leverage, ownership concentration, board size, and audit quality. However, no statistically significant relation was found between RPTs and firm profitability or board political connections. Several of these relations (or lack of relations) are contrary to the findings of extant studies from more-developed countries, and can arguably be attributed to the prevalence of the closelyheld business model in Jordan, where, regardless of the firm's financial conditions, high ownership concentration and close relations among board and top executive management positions are common, and the demand for an audit service of high quality is limited. Practical implications of these findings include that regulatory authorities in Jordan should enhance regulations and corporate governance codes to protect small shareholders and other stakeholders and restrict the power of dominant shareholders that makes them able to engage in illegitimate RPTs.. In doing so, it also has to improve its monitoring of companies more likely to engage in such RPTs.

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Section: H2: Financial Leverage Is Positively Associated With the Eximentioning

confidence: 86%

Listening Skills: Accountancy Educators in Retreat?

Reddrop¹,

Mapunda²

2019

AABFJ

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“…The higher the TMT network centrality, the higher the chance that a firm has political ties. Political ties provide access to preferential credit (Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishra, & Saffar, 2012;Chen, Wang, & Lin, 2014;Tee, 2018;Zhang, 2015). Charumilind, Kali, and Wiwattanakantang (2006) documented that firms with political connections enjoy longer maturity and fewer mortgages on credit than other firms.…”

Section: The Mediating Effects Of the Resource Channelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do social ties matter for corporate bond yield spreads? Evidence from China

Qiu

Xiao

2019

Corporate Governance

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Research Question/Issue: This paper studies the effect of top management team (TMT) network centrality on corporate bond yield spreads. In additional analyses, we examine the hierarchical structures of TMT and study which parts contribute to the decrease in bond yield spreads. We also examine the mediating roles (including informed trading probability, media coverage, political ties, financial ties, and bond ratings) and the moderating roles (including marketization and analysts following) in the correlation between TMT network centrality and corporate bond yield spreads.Research Findings/Insights: This paper finds that firms with high TMT network centrality are significantly negatively correlated with lower bond yield spreads. The findings are robust after controlling for a series of sensitivity checks and endogenous concerns. The results of the hierarchical structures show that the decrease of bond spreads is accounted for CFOs' networks and board members' networks, whereas the role of CEOs' networks is not apparent. More importantly, after controlling CEOs'

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“…More and more studies of corporate finance have been undertaken from a social network perspective. Numerous authors have assembled various types of social networks, such as board network (Larcker, So, & Wang, 2013), CEO network (El-Khatib, Fogel, & Jandik, 2015), venture capital network (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007) and so on, and they have provided empirical evidence of these networks' effects on corporate governance (Chen, Wang, & Lin, 2014;Nee, Liu, & DellaPosta, 2017;Kim, 2017). Supply networks share common features with these networks in terms of information acquisition and reciprocal cooperation.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply Network Position and Firm Performance: Evidence From Chinese Listed Manufacturing Companies

Shia

Yang

2019

Journal of Business Economics and Management

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The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between supply network position and firm performance. A-share manufacturing companies listed from 2013 to 2015 are chosen as the initial samples, and large sample supply networks are constructed with relational embeddedness and structural embeddedness. The location of supply network is depicted by network centrality and structural hole with social network analysis, and the influence of supply network position on the corporate performance is examined with multiple OLS regression analysis. This paper observes that a firms’ supply network position is an important factor affecting its performance. The higher the network centrality is, the richer the structural holes are, and the worse the company’s performance is. The results suggest that firms that have a high level of centrality or rich structural holes in their supply networks will gain limited information, resource and control benefits and face great business risks that may negatively influence their performance.

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Independent directors’ board networks and controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior

Cited by 39 publications

References 31 publications

Listening Skills: Accountancy Educators in Retreat?

Listening Skills: Accountancy Educators in Retreat?

Do social ties matter for corporate bond yield spreads? Evidence from China

Supply Network Position and Firm Performance: Evidence From Chinese Listed Manufacturing Companies

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