Indefinites and intentional identity

Cumming, Samuel

doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0131-9

Cited by 11 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…However, Cumming (2014) actually already presents an object-centric solution to Edelberg's Puzzle, making my proposal a rival theory.…”

Section: Cumming's Solution To Edelberg's Puzzlementioning

confidence: 97%

“…The original puzzle of intentional identity is from Geach (1967) but I have adapted some details from Edelberg (1986) whose examples I focus on in the bulk of the paper. I also follow Cumming (2014) in renaming the detectives as Oneskey and Twoskey for mnemonic purposes so that the names introduced are less distracting (than Hob, Nob, Bob, and Cob).…”

Section: Difficulties Of Quantifying Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An object-centric solution to Edelberg's puzzles of intentional identity

2022

Synthese

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My belief that Socrates was wise, and your belief that Socrates was mortal can be said to have a common focus, insofar as both these thoughts are about Socrates. In Peter Geach's terminology, the objects of our beliefs bear the feature of intentional identity, because our beliefs share the same putative target. But what if it turned out that Socrates never existed? Can a pair of thoughts share a common focus if the object both thoughts are about, does not actually, really exist? Object-centric accounts of intentionality which explain the aboutness or directedness of thought in terms of the intentional object the thought in question is about, contend that thoughts which share a common focus do so in virtue of both thoughts simply being about the same intentional object. However, Alexander Sandgren contends that such theories face difficulties in explaining a puzzle of intentional identity put forward by Walter Edelberg, in which a pair of sentences seem to differ in truth value but are purportedly logically equivalent on the object-centric theory. If this is right, then it seems that any account which explains intentionality with reference to an intentional object is threatened by this result, whether this object be abstract, merely possible, Meinongian, or otherwise. In this paper, I argue that Edelberg's Puzzle is analogous to Frege's Puzzle and the same tools conventionally used to solve Frege's Puzzle can be used to solve Edelberg's Puzzle. I then propose a new object-centric solution to Edelberg's Puzzle which takes into account modes of presentation and which is able to accommodate all the relevant linguistic data.

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“…However, Cumming (2014) actually already presents an object-centric solution to Edelberg's Puzzle, making my proposal a rival theory.…”

Section: Cumming's Solution To Edelberg's Puzzlementioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Difficulties Of Quantifying Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

An object-centric solution to Edelberg's puzzles of intentional identity

2022

Synthese

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“…We do not need not think of them as primitive entities; they might be (determined by) finer‐grained contents. Cumming's (), Lanier's () and Maier () offer accounts of the relevant attitudes couched in a Fregean ideology…”

Section: Pretend Reference and Presupposingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most recent proposals are consistent with Burge's appeal to quasi‐anaphoric links, providing elaborations of it . Some adopt variants of what Edelberg () calls realism , positing “exotic” objects: Edelberg () and Cumming () give accounts in terms of an ontology of “thought‐objects”, individuated by entities equivalent to Fregean senses, which might or might not coincide with actual referents; Salmon () posits actually existing abstract objects; Glick () and Pagin () give modal accounts, taking the quantifier to range over possible objects including non‐actual ones. Other approaches such as Priest's () and Azzouni's () question instead that quantifiers have the standardly assumed ontological commitments.…”

Section: Intentional Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Co‐Identification and Fictional Names

García‐Carpintero

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Stacie Friend raises a problem of "co-identification" involving fictional names such as 'Hamlet' or 'Odysseus': how to explain judgments that different uses of these names are "about the same object", on the assumption of irrealism about fictional characters on which such expressions do not refer. To deal with this issue, she contrasts a Kripke-inspired "name-centric" approach, pursued among others by Sainsbury, with an Evans-inspired "info-centric" approach, which she prefers. The approach is motivated by her rejection of descriptivist ways of dealing with the problem. In this paper, I rely on the presuppositional, referencefixing form of descriptivism I favor for the semantics of names, and I explain how it helps us deal with Friend's problem, which I take to concern primarily the semantic contribution of names to ascriptions of representational content to fictions. The result is a form of the "name-centric" sort of approach that Friend rejects, which can (I'll argue) stand her criticisms.

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Intentional Identity

Rooij¹

2020

The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Semantics

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Indefinites and intentional identity

Cited by 11 publications

References 22 publications

An object-centric solution to Edelberg's puzzles of intentional identity

An object-centric solution to Edelberg's puzzles of intentional identity

Co‐Identification and Fictional Names

Intentional Identity

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