Inconsistency Theories: The Significance of Semantic Ascent

Patterson, Douglas

doi:10.1080/00201740701698522

Cited by 13 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…1 1 In order to set aside complications arising from the semantic paradoxes, I ignore problems that arise from the worry that the truth‐definition for a language might be translatable into that language. I have commented on the paradoxes elsewhere (2007a, 2007b, forthcoming a) and what I say here could easily be extended in terms of the view I have developed. Since all the problems covered in this paper arise even if we consider definitions for languages free of semantic vocabulary and other paradox‐inducing features, no harm is done in leaving the issue aside. …”

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confidence: 79%

Truth-definitions and Definitional Truth

Patterson¹

2008

Midwest Studies in Philosophy

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confidence: 79%

Truth-definitions and Definitional Truth

Patterson¹

2008

Midwest Studies in Philosophy

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“…See Scharp 2008Scharp , 2013 13. See, for example, Chihara (1979Chihara ( , 1984, Eklund (2002aEklund ( , 2002bEklund ( , 2007Eklund ( , 2008a, and Patterson (2006Patterson ( , 2007Patterson ( , 2009). Beall and Priest (ibid.…”

Section: The Aletheic Paradoxesmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…I do not have, in the terminology earlier introduced, a positive theory of the liar." I imagine that Beall and Priest would say the same about most of the other members of the inconsistency tradition (for example, Chihara [1979], Tappenden [1993], Patterson [2006], Burgess and Burgess [2011], and me [2007,2008]). 14 For what it is worth, I agree with them.…”

Section: The Aletheic Paradoxesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truth, the Liar, and Relativism

Scharp

2013

Philosophical Review

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“…Hence any reason against taking them to be meaningful is suffi cient to warrant the rejection of the claim that they are meaningful. I have provided reason against taking words and sentences to be meaningful in familiar natural languages and the idiolects of what are commonly regarded as speakers of those languages elsewhere (Patterson 2007(Patterson , 2007a(Patterson , 2008(Patterson , 2009 and will return to the topic only briefl y below. My concern here is rather to fi ll in the details of the account of communication introduced in those other papers, to show that the account is independently motivated, and in particular to address concerns as to whether the claim that communication is possible without meaning is compatible with the possibility of learning by testimony.…”

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Meaning, Communication and Knowledge by Testimony

Patterson¹

2012

Prospects for Meaning

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Why does meaning matter? It is common to think that communication depends on it: were I to fail to know what your words mean, I would be unable to draw any conclusions either about what you are trying to convey to me when you talk, or about the world about which you talk, to the extent that I take your talking to express your knowledge. I will argue that this is mistaken: communication and the gathering of knowledge by testimony depend not on knowledge of the meanings of words, but rather on knowledge of what speakers mean by their words. I intend by this more than a bland emphasis on speaker's meaning as opposed to meaning in a "public" language: communication and knowledge by testimony go just fi ne even if the speaker's words mean nothing at all in any language. I'll develop these ideas, relate them to work on the semantic paradoxes, and discuss the role of the human language faculty in the facilitation of communication. To have a label, one could call the view I will present "non-factive cognitivism" about semantic theory: semantic competence is a psychologically real relation to a semantic theory, but the theory in question need not be true.Why believe that the words and sentences we use to communicate with one another have the meanings they appear to have? 1 The answers seem to be two: because they just seem to have these meanings and because if they weren't meaningful our ability to communicate would be compromised. In what follows I will dispatch both responses, focusing mostly on the second. Communication and even the transmission of knowledge by testimony do not require that the sentence used means anything. This being so, if there are widely shared impressions of meaning, we have no reason to accept 1 This article was written during the term of a Forschungsstipendium für erfahrene Wissenschaftler from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for research done at the

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Inconsistency Theories: The Significance of Semantic Ascent

Cited by 13 publications

References 10 publications

Truth-definitions and Definitional Truth

Truth-definitions and Definitional Truth

Truth, the Liar, and Relativism

Meaning, Communication and Knowledge by Testimony

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