Income Inequality, Reciprocity and Public Good Provision: An Experimental Analysis

Hofmeyr, Andre; Burns, Justine; Visser, Martine

doi:10.1111/j.1813-6982.2007.00127.x

Cited by 51 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Kocher et al (2008) also tested for an effect of stake size on behavior and concluded that it had no significant effect on contribution levels (ibid.). Another study with urban high-school students lent further support to the above result, showing contributions to the public good averaging 33% throughout the game (Hofmeyr, Burns, and Visser 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 58%

Climate change in a public goods game: Investment decision in mitigation versus adaptation

Hasson

Löfgren²,

Visser

2010

Ecological Economics

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We use behavioral and experimental economics to study a particular aspect of the economics of climate change: the potential tradeoff between countries' investments in mitigation versus adaptation.While mitigation of greenhouse gases can be viewed as a public good, adaptation to climate change is a private good, benefiting only the country or the individual that invests in adaptation. We use a one-shot public-goods game that deviates from the standard public-goods game by introducing a stochastic term to account for probabilistic destruction in a climate-change setting. Probability density function is mapped to within-group levels of mitigation. We compare low-vulnerability and high-vulnerability treatments by varying the magnitude of disaster across treatments. Our results show that there is no significant difference in the level of mitigation across these treatments. Further, our results emphasize the important role of trust in enhancing cooperation.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 58%

Climate change in a public goods game: Investment decision in mitigation versus adaptation

Hasson

Löfgren²,

Visser

2010

Ecological Economics

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“…The first two hypotheses are based on the respective results by Hofmeyer et al (2007), whose experiment is very similar to ours.…”

Section: Hypothesis 2: All Player Types Contribute the Same Proportiomentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Investigating endowment heterogeneity in a linear VCM game, Hofmeyer et al (2007) find that endowment heterogeneity does not have any significant impact on the group-contribution level.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Social Costs of Inequality Heterogeneous Endowments in Public-Good Experiments

et al. 2014

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Chair of Microeconomics, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073 Germany Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may September 25, 2014Abstract: We compare voluntary contributions to the financing of a public good in a symmetric setting to those in asymmetric settings, in which four players have different, randomly allocated endowments. We observe that a weak asymmetry in the endowment distribution leads to the same contribution level as symmetry. Players tend to contribute the same proportion of their respective endowment. In a strongly asymmetric setting, where one player has a higher endowment than the three other players together, we observe significantly lower group contributions than in the other settings. The super-rich player does not contribute significantly more than what the others contribute on average and thus a much lower proportion of the endowment.JEL classification: C92, D63, H41.

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“…Abstract: In a public-good experiment with heterogeneous endowments, we investigate if and how the contribution level as well as the previously observed fair-share rule of equal contributions relative to one's endowment (Hofmeyr et al, 2007; may be influenced by minimum-contribution requirements. We consider three different schedules: FixMin, requiring the same absolute contributions, RelMin, requiring the same relative contributions, and ProgMin, requiring minimum contributions that progressively increase with the endowment.…”

Section: Standard-nutzungsbedingungenmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The first measure goes back to the fair-share rule in Hofmeyr et al (2007) and ; it measures the absolute contributions of the player types 11 For Type 10 (player 1) and Type 20 (player 4) the averages are based on ten players for each average, each. For Type 15 (players 2 and 3), the averages are based on twenty players.…”

Section: Comparison Within Treatmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mandatory Minimum Contributions, Heterogenous Endowments and Voluntary Public-Good Provision

2014

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: In a public-good experiment with heterogeneous endowments, we investigate if and how the contribution level as well as the previously observed fair-share rule of equal contributions relative to one's endowment (Hofmeyr et al., 2007; may be influenced by minimum-contribution requirements. We consider three different schedules: FixMin, requiring the same absolute contributions, RelMin, requiring the same relative contributions, and ProgMin, requiring minimum contributions that progressively increase with the endowment. We find that minimum contributions exert norm-giving character and may lead to an increase in average group contributions. This is especially true for the progressive schedule. On the individual level, this schedule leads to higher relative contributions by the wealthier players and thus violates the fair-share norm. On the group level, it leads to the highest contribution level and the lowest inequality in total profits as measured by the Gini index. Terms of use: Documents inJEL classification: C92, D63, H41

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Income Inequality, Reciprocity and Public Good Provision: An Experimental Analysis

Cited by 51 publications

References 24 publications

Climate change in a public goods game: Investment decision in mitigation versus adaptation

Climate change in a public goods game: Investment decision in mitigation versus adaptation

Social Costs of Inequality Heterogeneous Endowments in Public-Good Experiments

Mandatory Minimum Contributions, Heterogenous Endowments and Voluntary Public-Good Provision

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